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PREFACE 
In 1947 Great Britain together its Caribbean colonies to discuss the idea of a 
closer association among them. The British wanted the colonies to Wlite in a federation 
to which Britain would give independence and entry into the Commonwealth. After 
World War II it was an accepted view among the larger countries that small nations could 
not compete economically and survive politically in the modem world. Britain's belief in 
this theory led them to their offer of 1947. 
However, in their efforts to rid themselves of their economically poor colonies in 
the Caribbean, the British failed to take into consideration the insularity they had fostered 
for years in the area. Although Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward 
Islands of Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and the Windward Islands 
of Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent shared much in common, including 
their agriculture-based economy and their British heritage, they had lived independently 
of each other for centuries. Although they agreed to explore the possibility of federation, 
and even embarked on the venture for four short years, their reluctance to give up their 
new-found political freedom brought about the collapse of their federation. 
The West Indies Federation is important to the field of British colonial history 
because it offers a different perspective on British decolonization. These islands were not 
attempting to divorce themselves from Britain, as so many of their other colonies were. 
The people of the British Caribbean admired the British and their institutions. The 
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British West Indies islanders simply wanted the freedom to control their own destinies 
without the help of colonial masters. They wanted political and economic freedom, but 
within the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those associated with this study. In 
particular, I am indebted to my major adviser, Dr. Elizabeth Williams, for her guidance 
and patience. I appreciate the advice of my other committee members, Dr. Joseph 
Byrnes and Dr. Ronald Petrin, as well. Finally, I am especially grateful for the support 
and encouragement of my husband, Steve. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
"Ten minus one equals zero." With these words Eric Williams of Trinidad 
proclaimed the end of the West Indies Federation. A political union that the ten islands 
of the British Caribbean, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad, the Leeward Islands of Antigua, 
Montserrat, and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and the Windward Islands of Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, had put together over eleven years, lasted for only 
four . After numerous conferences, committees, and meetings where the islands debated 
economic, social. and political problems, it was a local decision by one island, Jamaica, 
that caused the demise of this political unit. 
However, it was a poor decision on the part of Great Britain that made the 
Federation of its Caribbean colonies an almost impossible task from the beginning. The 
British had spent years keeping the islands separate from each other, treating them 
independently politically and economically, while at the same time waving the prospect 
of independence as a coalition before them. When the West Indies islanders chose to 
come together, they believed, because the British had always presented it that way in the 
past, that it was the only way to attain the political freedom from colonial rule that they 
all desired. However, what each ofthe island colonies wanted most was individual 
independence, not a coalition government. Throughout the years of debate 
over the structure of the Federation, a common theme was the fear of the islands, 
particularly the smaller ones, that they were just trading one colonial ruler for another, 
albeit in a different form. They never proceeded far enough to find out whether or not 
that would have been the case. Although the British Caribbean colonies were 
geographically and culturally diverse, which even the islanders pointed to as a potential 
problem for the Federation, they actually had much in common. They shared similar 
economic and social problems. They were aillarge~y agricultural economies, with the 
exception of Trinidad which had an oil industry, with high rates of unemployment and 
few prospects for development. 
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They shared their British colonial heritage as well. The islands had been united in 
their ties to Britain for more than one hundred years. They shared similar political 
institutions, although their level of political development varied widely as late as 1950. 
Barbados, the oldest ofthe British colonies, was the most "British" of the islands, but 
both Jamaica and Trinidad had some experience with representative government. The 
smaller islands were the least politically developed, but they too had some say in their 
own governance by 1950. 
The years between 1935 and 1945 were particularly important in the history of 
West Indies political development. Beginning in 1935 the islands erupted in a series of 
labor strikes and riots that protested the islands' poor economic and social status. Britain 
responded by sending a commission to study conditions on the islands and make 
recommendations for improvements. The Moyne Commission report advocated a series 
of measures to improve the Ii ves of the islanders. In addition, it recommended that the 
British explore the possibility of federation among the islands in preparation for 
independence. World War II interrupted the negotiations between the British and the 
islanders. When the war ended Britain was economically depressed and faced with a 
growing sense of nationalism in all its colonies. The Caribbean islands were no 
exception. They did, however, differ substantially from independence movements in 
other British colonies. The West Indian islanders considered themselves British. They 
had no desire to break away from their mother country; they simply wanted the political 
freedom to rule their own islands within the British Commonwealth. In that sense they 
afforded Britain an opportunity to provide a model of friendly decolonization for their 
other colonies. On the other hand, the islands ' desire to remain closely tied to Britain 
may have led the British to ignore the problems that did beset the decolonization process 
in the Caribbean. 
3 
The British did acknowledge that changes were needed in the West Indies. They 
agreed that the islands were ready to pursue independence and took steps to achieve that 
end. The British never considered independence for the islands on an individual basis, 
because they believed the islands were too small to function independently in the modern 
post-war world. Instead, the British offered the idea of closer association between the 
islands. The concept of federation was not one the British reserved for the Caribbean. At 
the same time the Colonial Office was proposing federation in parts of Africa and Asia. 
It was an idea they had proposed unsuccessfully several times before in the Caribbean. 
This time the islands agreed to discuss the issue. At a conference held in Montego Bay, 
Jamaica, in 1947, the islands formally asked the British to consider a federation of its 
Caribbean colonies. The British would argue later that the islands had initiated the 
process of federation in I 947 of their own accord. It was clear to most, including some 
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members of the British Parliament, that the people of the West Indies would never have 
promulgated the concept of federation unless they believed that it was the only way to 
attain their independence. They were convinced of this because the British had told them 
so for years. 
With British support, the islands spent the next eleven years working out the 
details of the West Indies Federation. In a series of conferences the islands debated every 
issue imaginable. They argued over how to finance the federation, and how much power 
the central government should have, specifically whether the central government should 
have its own source of revenue or be dependent upon the islands for support. They 
discussed over and over again the relative strength of island representation in the Federal 
House of Representatives. They argued about how much freedom individual islanders 
should have to move from one island to another within the Federation. They debated the 
site of the federal capital. The islands' representatives revised and amended, usually 
more than once, every decision they initially made. 
By 1958 the British West Indies had a Federation, but the negotiations that had 
preceded its inauguration continued throughout its short life. The islands still could not 
solve any problem easily. Finally, Jamaica, the most politically and economically 
advanced of the islands, virtually demanded a Federation on its own terms, and 
threatened to withdraw if it did not get what it wanted. Although the other islands 
acceded to the weak Federation Jamaica demanded, it was already too late to save the 
new country. In 1961 the voters of Jamaica elected to withdraw from the Federation. 
Trinidad followed their example and the Federation ended in 1962. 
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At the same time the islands were haggling over the political and economic 
problems of federation, they were cooperating in a number of ventures. The islands had 
no trouble coming together to handle regional problems or to foster regional 
development. Although they had no history of area-wide cooperation before World War 
II, that did not deter them from successfully collaborating to solve problems that affected 
the whole region. What was different from the proposed federation was that no one asked 
them to give up political or economic freedom in order to join a commission. The islands 
remained independent entities that recognized the advantages of cooperation. 
The British failed to achieve federation in the West Indies because they ignored 
the true desires of the islanders, who wanted political freedom for their individual islands. 
They were not adverse to cooperating with each other; they even recognized how much 
they had in common as West Indies and British colonial SUbjects,. Yet they were 
reluctant to give up what economic control they had or hoped to have in the future, and 
they were even more adverse to relinquishing the political freedom that they had never 
experienced before, and to which they aspired. The West Indies could have been a model 
of cooperative British decolonization. Actually, in many ways it was because the British 
gave the islanders an enormous amount of freedom to work out their own problems and 
develop their own federation. However, the failed Federation could not become a lasting 
symbol of decoJonization. 
The British could have allowed each island to develop at its own pace, while at 
the same time encouraging cooperation on common issues. Eventually, the islands might 
have come to see federation as a viable option. At that latter time, they would have 
experienced the freedom of controlling their own destinies and have been aware of what 
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they would have to give up and what they could expect in return. They might also have 
chosen to remain independent, but regionally cooperating nations. However, by 
preaching the idea of federation for so many years, the British led the islands to believe 
that it was the only way they could ever hope to achieve independence. Although the 
British insisted that the West Indies had chosen this option for themselves, it was the only 
possible choice the islands believed would be successful. In fact, the British offered the 
islands no choice, and the islands failed to seek another option on their own. 
The history of the West Indies Federation has received little attention over the 
years. Books and articles written before 1962, the year the Federation failed, emphasized 
the positive benefits the West Indies islands could expect from the plan. Morley Ayearst 
acknowledged the weak ties between the islands, but concluded that federal union was the 
only viable method by which the islands could hope to gain economic and political 
independence.' Albert Gomes, a Trinidadian who was participating in the federal 
process, cited the economic and political problems the Federation would have to confront, 
but recorded his confidence that federation was the future of the West lndies and that it 
would succeed. 2 Sir Hugh Foot, the British Governor of Jamaica, expressed the same 
confidence as Gomes. Foot believed that federation was the only viable option for the 
British West Indies if they hoped to compete successfully in the international 
, Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search/or Self-Government (New 
York: New York University Press, 1960). 
2Albert Gomes, "Federation in the British West Indies," in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., 
The Caribbean: Its Political Problems (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
1956): 275-289. 
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marketplace. He was convinced that federation was the right choice for the small islands 
of the British Caribbean.3 
Jesse Proctor believed that the Federation could work out its economic and 
political problems as well. Proctor stressed the importance of the federal experiment for 
the rest ofthe world. He claimed that the Federation would be beneficial to the rest ofthe 
Caribbean because it offered an example of a democratic government with a free and 
loyal opposition and respect for individual rights. In addition, he was convinced that the 
Federation would counter any threat from the non-democratic governments of Latin 
America. On a wider scale, Proctor called the Federation an example of a graceful retreat 
from colonization.4 
Works published after 1962 focused on the failure of the Federation. In The West 
Indies: The Federal Negotiations , John Mordecai and Arthur Lewis blamed the downfall 
of the Federation on its leaders, particularly Grantley Adams, the prime minister of the 
Federation, Norman Manley, the prime minister of Jamaica, and Eric Williams, the prime 
minister of Trinidad. Mordecai claimed that each man fai led to realize, at least until it 
was too late, that compromise was necessary for the success of the Federation. Instead, 
each tried to impose his own views on the whole. Mordecai emphasized that each should 
have known better. All three were educated at Oxford and had extensive experience in 
JSir Hugh Foot, "Great Britain and the Building of a New Self-Governing Nation 
in the Caribbean," in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean: Contemporary International 
Relations (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1963): 53-58. Although this 
article appeared in 1963, Foot discussed events in the British Caribbean prior to 1958. 
4Jesse Harris Proctor, Jr., "The International Significance of the Federation of 
British Caribbean Territories," in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean: Contemporary 
International Relations (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1963): 59-68. 
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public service. Yet when it came to the Federation, these men put insular pride before the 
good of the Federation.5 Elisabeth Wallace was also critical of the islands' leadership. 
She contended that the personal antagonisms among Adams, Manley, and Williams were 
so acute that they could not even agree to compromise for the sake of the Federation. In 
her view Adams was a weak federal prime minister, and Manley and Williams could not 
see beyond their local identities to support the Federation for the good of all the islands. 
She blamed all three men, as well as the leaders of the smaller islands, for failing to sell 
the idea of federation to the local voters.6 
Although Charles Archibald dwelled on the decisions of Manley and Williams 
too, he offered a different interpretation of their efforts. Archibald credited the failure of 
these leaders of Jamaica and Trinidad to reach agreement on their economic problems for 
the demise of the Federation.7 In her study of the Leeward and Windward Islands, 
Carleen O'Loughlin focused on the relationship between the large and smaIl islands. She 
cited economic problems, specifically the debate over how to finance the Federation and 
how much aid the smaller islands could expect from the Federal government, for the 
collapse of the Federation. In addition she pointed out that the small islands were 
Slohn Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1968). 
6Elisabeth Wallace, The British Caribbeanfrom the Decline o/Colonialism to the 
End o/the Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); Elisabeth Wallace, 
"The West Indies: Improbable Federation?" Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 27 (November 1961): 444-459; Elisabeth Wallace, "The West Indies 
Federation: Decline and Fall," International Journal 17 (Summer 1962): 269-288. 
7Charles H. Archibald, "The Failure of the West Indies Federation," The World 
Today 18 (June 1962): 233-242. 
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committed to the concept more than the larger islands, but the Federation could not work 
without the commitment of the larger islands.8 
Harold Mitchell offered a broader perspective on the Federation. He claimed that 
the failure of the Federation was rooted in its past, where previous British attempts to 
unite the islands politically had failed. He cited the British history of keeping the islands 
separate, thereby encouraging their isolation. As a result, each island's loyalty was first 
to itself. There was no history of a wider West Indian view of the future in the islands of 
the British West Indies.9 
Despite the importance some of these authors attached to the West Indies 
Federation in the history of British decolonization, most historians of the British empire 
and decolonization have given the Federation little attention. In fact, some failed to 
mention the West Indies at all. 10 Others mentioned the West Indies in passing references, 
but did not discuss the Federation. 11 It is likely that historians of British decolonization 
8Carleen O'Loughlin, Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and 
Windward Islands' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
9Harold P. Mitchell, Europe in the Caribbean (London: W. & R. Chambers, Ltd., 
1963); Harold P. Mitchell, Caribbean Patterns: A PoliticaL and Economic Study afthe 
Contemporary Caribbean (London: W. & R. Chambers, Ltd., ] 967). 
lOSee, for example, D.A. Low, Eclipse of Empire (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 199]); Tony Smith, ed., The End of the European Empire: 
Decolonization after World War II (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975). 
P. 1. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-
1970 (New York: Longman, 1993) devoted entire chapters to India, Africa, and South 
America, but dismissed the West Indies Federation in one sentence. 
liSee, for example, Martin Kitchen, The British Empire and Commonwealth: A 
Short History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: 
A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 (New York: Longman, 1975). 
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have chosen to ignore the West Indies because the islands represented a small and 
relatively unimportant part of British decolonization history after World War II. Most 
historians have chosen to concentrate instead on British efforts in India and Africa, both 
of which were more problematic in the history of British decoloruzation. 
John Darwin did address the West Indies Federation. He claimed that the British 
were indifferent to the region because it offered little hope for the future . In contrast to 
the Asian colonies which offered the prospect of wealth, power and glamour, and the 
African colonies which presented the opporturuty to develop new states, societies, and 
econorrues, the West Indies' days of glory had passed. Darwin called the islands a 
monument to colonial failure because they were poverty-stricken, politically backward, 
and economically and politically fragmented. He blamed the death of the Federation on 
local island nationalism which contributed to the islands' failure to develop a West Indian 
nationalism. 12 
Although all these authors reached conclusions that could explain the failure of 
the Federation, most did not address the underlying cause of the problems. Mitchell 
blamed the British for their colonial policies, but stopped short of blaming them for 
planting the root of the federation idea in the minds of the islanders. The British knew 
the West Indies. The Colonial office had always treated the islands individually. The 
West Indian islanders had always rejected the idea of federating. However, in 1945, 
when the British made the commitment to disband their empire, they believed that the 
only way for the West Indies to achieve independence was by federating . Even with their 
l2]ohn Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreatfrom Empire in the Post-
War World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). 
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knowledge of the West Indies, they never sought another option. The West Indian 
leaders, despite their growing nationalist views, believed that the only way to achieve 
independence was the British way. These were people who admired the colonial leaders. 
They considered themselves British. So they decided to federate. The British ignored the 
signs of nationalism in the West Indies and persisted in their old idea of federation. The 
result was a failed federation. 
Previous studies ofthe West Indies Federation have included chronicles of the 
daily events, and economic, social, or political studies of some aspect of the federal 
negotiations. This work will use British government documents along with previous 
monographs to present a synthesis of the process that will show the steps the islands took 
toward federation as well as the economic and political problems that plagued the 
negotiations. In this way it will provide a more comprehensive survey of the pre-federal 
and federal periods in British West Indies history. 
CHAPTERH 
BRlT AIN AND THE WEST INDIES 
Britain had a long history in the West Indies. It established representative 
govenunents from the beginning. The first settlers, in the seventeenth century, made their 
own laws and set up their own govenuncnts modeled after those of the mother country. 
In the nineteenth century the British took control and established crown colony 
govenunents in the islands. In the twentieth century the British began to give the 
colonies more control over their own affairs with the introduction of elected legislatures. 
The most substantial changes occurred between 1935 and 1947. Economic distress in the 
islands led to strikes and riots in the late 1930s. Britain responded with proposals for 
economic assistance and political concessions, which went forward despite the 
intervention of World War II. However, the war altered the course of British policy. 
When it ended Britain faced problems at home and around the world that changed its 
attitude toward its colonies. The war affected the way the colonies perceived their own 
futures as well. The West Indies provided support for the British war effort in both men 
and money. This helped to convince the islands of their own ability to function 
independently in the post-war world. 
Spain was the first European power to inhabit the West Indies in the sixteenth 
century. It was not until the early seventeenth century, when Spanish influence had 
12 
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begun to decline, that other European countries took an interest in the region. Britain, 
France and the Netherlands each began to settle on West Indies islands. I 
Barbados was first settled by the British, who landed on the uninhabited island in 
1627. It was the only island that could claim an unbroken link with Britain from that 
time, which made it the most British of the colonies and accounted for its nicknanle, 
"Little Britain.,,2 Jamaica was originally occupied, although never settled, by the 
Spanish, before it came under British control in 1655. It was formally ceded by Spain in 
1670.3 The Leeward Islands of Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts-Nevis-AnguiLla 
changed hands repeatedly in the course of conflict between the European powers. The 
English settled St. Kitts in 1623, making it the first British settlement in the Caribbean. 
The French captured it and the British retook it on several occasions until France finally 
ceded it to Britain in 1783 under the Treaty of Versailles. British settlers from St. Kitts 
moved to Nevis, Antigua, and Montserrat, the smallest of the islands committed to 
federation, in 1632. The French and British also fought for control of these islands until 
Britain received Nevis and Montserrat in 1783, also by the Treaty of Versailles. Antigua 
finally became British in 1666.4 
I Great Britain, Colonial Office, The West Indies: A Nation in the Making 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958),3. 
2Great Britain, British Information Services, Barbados (London: Central Office 
ofInformation, 1966), 1-4; The West Indies , 3. 
JGreat Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on Jamaica for the Year 1948 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), 78-82; The West Indies, 3. 
4Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on the Leeward Islands for the Years 1949 
& 1950 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951),53-55; The West Indies, 3. 
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Trinidad remained a Spanish colony for nearly three hundred years, although the 
French, Dutch and English attacked it repeatedly as well. Finally, in 1797 the British 
captured and controlled it and the Spanish ceded it to England under the Treaty of 
Amiens in 1802. Tobago remained Spanish for another twelve years until it became a 
British colony in 1814. Tobago became part of Trinidad, as ajoint colony, in 1889.5 The 
Windward Islands of Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent changed hands 
regularly as well. The French settled Dominica in 1632, and Grenada and St. Lucia in 
1650. Although shipwrecked blacks first settled on St. Vincent, the French overran the 
island in the seventeenth century. The French and British fought for control of all four 
islands throughout the eighteenth century, but the British ultimately prevailed. They 
captured Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent in 1783, and St. Lucia in 1814.6 
The British established a form of representative government in all the islands. 
The first constitutions followed the British example. A governor represented the 
sovereign. There was a nominated legislative council patterned on the House of Lords 
and an elected assembly like the House of Commons. The king, on the recommendation 
of the governor, nominated members to serve on the legislative council. One of the 
council's principal functions was to act as a check on the governor. The Barbados House 
of Assembly first met in 1639. St. Kitts had an elected assembly and a council by 1650. 
Jamaica's first assembly met in 1663. When Antigua became British in 1663, and 
5Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on Trinidad & Tobago, B. WI , for 
the Year 1947 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949),88, 93,111-114; The 
West Indies, 3-4. 
6Great Britain, Colonial Office, A nnual Report on Dominica, B. W.I, for the Year 
1948 (London: His Majesty ' s Stationery Office, 1949),32-34; The West Indies, 3. 
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Montserrat, Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent in 1783, they also received constitutions 
from the British. 7 
St. Lucia and Trinidad were the only islands that did not inherit a British 
constitution. St. Lucia continued under the French system already in place until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. In Trinidad, the British maintained the Spanish laws 
until they converted all the colonies to direct crown colony government in the nineteenth 
century.8 
By the seventeenth century sugar was the basis of all economic activity on the 
islands. The cultivation of sugar and its preparation for export required extensive land 
and a large labor force. Large plantations began to replace the original small holdings and 
African slaves replaced European laborers. A pattern of society developed in which a 
small European oligarchy and a large number of African slaves relied heavily on sugar 
for their welfare. After a century ofthis existence, the British, by an Act of Parliament in 
1834, abolished slavery in all its territories. In the West Indies, the emancipated slaves 
left the sugar plantations in the thousands, acquired their own plots of land, and began to 
work for themselves. To replace the lost workers, West Indian sugar planters adopted the 
practice of bringing in immigrant laborers, chiefly from India, under an indenture 
system.9 
7The West Indies, 3-5 . 
8Annual Report on Trinidad & Tobago, 1947,87-90; The West indies, 5. 
9The West Indies, 4. 
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In the nineteenth century the British decided to take a finner hand in the political 
operation oftheir colonies in the Caribbean. There had been constant friction between 
the assemblies, which controlled the supply of money, and the governors, who were 
responsible for administering the colonies. From about 1830 onwards the situation 
deteriorated. Social problems created by the vast numbers of emancipated slaves and 
economic problems arising from increasingly severe competition in the sugar trade 
produced growing unrest throughout the islands. Between 1854 and 1898, in a two-step 
process that was similar throughout the islands, the British first merged the elected 
assemblies and the nominated councils into single partly ejected, partly nominated, 
legislative councils. Then they replaced these with wholly official and nominated 
legislatures and executives, in other words crown colony governments, which the British 
claimed gave the unrepresented classes the direct protection of the crown. Although the 
governors had wide-ranging power to impose their will in the public interest, the British 
maintained that the force of public opinion would effecti vely prevent arbitrary decisions 
on their part. In that way, British officials contended, those who were unrepresented 
under the old systems of government could now voice their opinions openly and expect to 
be heard. This was in lieu, of course, of granting them direct representation. 10 
One important point to note was that in the process of converting to crown colony 
government the Leeward Islands used the authority granted in their original constitutions 
to institute the change by local acts, so in these colonies the crown had no power to 
10The British defended the change by pointing out that the colonial legislatures in 
each island chose to convert to crown colony government and voted their own elected 
assemblies out of existence. See the West Indies, 6; Great Britain, Colonial Office, West 
India Royal Commission Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945), 57. 
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legislate by Order-in-Council. Rather, Parliament had to enact legislation on matters 
outside the authority of the local legislatures. The other West Indian legislatures, with 
the exception of Barbados which did not convert to crown colony government, renounced 
their constitutions to the crown and thereby lost the authority to effect changes in their 
system of government by their own enactments. The British gave them new constitutions 
in which the crown retained the right to legislate for them by Order-in-Council. II 
Federation was an idea that surfaced more than once in the political history of the 
West Indies. In 1922, E.F.L. Wood, the under-secretary of state for the colonies, 
explored the idea of federation in the eastern Caribbean and concluded that the islands 
could only achieve federation if they wanted it themselves. He reported that public 
opinion had not advanced to that stage yet. In 1933, the new secretary of state for the 
colonies, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, appointed a commission to explore the idea of federation 
once more. It suggested a federation of Trinidad, the Leeward Islands, and the Windward 
Islands, which the islands rejected because, in addition, the report concluded that it would 
cost the islands more to operate under a federal than their current systems of government 
By the late 1930s, however, when the world-wide depression brought severe 
economic distress to the already depressed agricultural economies of the islands, they 
were actively protesting their colonial condition. The long duration of the 1930s 
depression caused decreased income and irregular employment and eventually led to a 
II The West Indies, 6. 
12West India Royal Commission Report, 324-326. 
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series of strikes and riots, uncommon events in the 1930s Caribbean, beginning with a 
sugar strike in Trinidad from May to July 1934, and in St. Kitts in January 1935. In 
February there was an oil field strike and hunger march in Trinidad. In May dock 
workers in Jamaica went on strike. In October St. Vincent residents demonstrated against 
increased taxes, and in November coal workers struck in St. Lucia. 13 After relative quiet 
in 1936, there were a series of strikes in Trinidad in June 1937, foHowed by outbreaks in 
Barbados and St. Lucia in July, and in Jamaica in August. In January and May 1938, 
strikes and riots occurred once more in Jamaica. 14 
The British feared the growing unrest and political agitation. Working-class 
interests became more important in the colonies and new leaders surfaced to replace the 
traditional middle-class leadership in many of the colonies. The Barbados Labour Party, 
the Jamaica Labour Party, and the People's National Party of Jamaica supported a new 
13Great Britain, Colonial Office, British Dependencies in the Caribbean and 
North Atlantic, 1939-1952 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952),3; Great 
Britain, British Information Services, Trinidad and Tobago: The Making afa Nation 
(London: British Government Reference Division, 1962), 7-8; West India Royal 
Commission Report, 196-197; John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal 
Negotiations (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968),26; Annette Baker Fox, 
Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean: A Colonial Dilemma (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1949),29-30. 
14Great Britain, British Information Services, Jamaica: The Making of a Nation 
(London: Cox & Sharland, Ltd., 1962), 5; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 331 (1938), 1038-1039; vol. 335 (1938),871-874; 
vol. 336 (1938),1196-1200,1420-1421; British Dependencies in the Caribbean, 3; West 
India Royal Commission Report, 196; Mordecai, The West Indies, 27. 
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kind of political movement that challenged British imperial policy. IS Each colony had a 
different idea, however, about what was necessary to ameliorate its own problems. 16 
The British realized they had to respond to the unrest and try to blunt the growing 
power of the labor movement. In 1938 they announced that the West India Royal 
Commission, commonly referred to as the Moyne Commission, would undertake a wide-
ranging inquiry into the situation in the West Indies. The government authorized the 
Moyne Commission to investigate social and economic conditions throughout the British 
Caribbean, which it did from October 1938 to April 1939, and to make recommendations 
for further action. 17 
In a preliminary report issued in February 1940, the Moyne Commission 
concluded that the region urgently needed social services that it could not afford. It 
recommended unifying certain branches of public service, particularly the medical. 's 
'5The Leeward and Windward Islands' middle-class leaders were able to control 
island politics until after the war, but by 1947 trade unionism had made inroads there as 
well. See Mordecai, The Westlndies, 27. 
'6British Dependencies in the Caribbean, 1939-1952,3; John Darwin, Britain and 
Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1988),218; Mordecai, The West Indies, 27. 
17 West India Royal Commission Report, xi-xii; Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), vol. 338 (1938), 3299-3300. 
'8The British delayed the issuance of the full text of the Moyne Commission 
report until June 1945 because of the outbreak of World War II in August 1940. They 
feared that any public acknowledgment of the unrest in the colonies might undermine 
colonial solidarity during the war. They feared, also, that their enemies might perceive a 
negative report as propaganda to be used against England. British Dependencies in the 
Caribbean, 1939-1952,3-4; Mordecai, The West Indies, 28; Darwin, Britain and 
Decolonisation, 218; Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean, 31, 124. 
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As regards politics, the Moyne Commission heard a number of complaints from 
the West Indies islanders, one of which involved crown colony government. They 
protested that public opinion, which was intended to present the minority view to the 
governor, had little impact on him. In fact, the governor listened to all views, but acted 
upon those that agreed with his own opinion. As a result, critics of government policy 
became part of a permanent opposition whose opinions remained just opinions, and not 
practical alternative measures to government policy. The commission responded by 
recommending the extension of the franchise in all the colonies, because it was the next 
logical step towards self-government, and because it would give the people more 
influence in local governmental affairs. In order to accomplish a wider franchise the 
commission advocated lowering voting qualifications, which varied from island to island. 
In every case, though, they were high in relation to average local income. For example, 
in Trinidad in 1938 only 6.6 percent of the population qualified to vote. In Barbados the 
percentage of qualified voters was only 3.3 percent of the population. 19 
It was also the Moyne Commission that again called for the political federation of 
the West Indies colonies. The commission heard testimony from a number of local 
witnesses on all the islands who favored some type of closer union of the colonies but 
were for the most part unable to define what exactly they expected from a federation. 
After hearing the testimony, the commission reached the conclusion that West Indian 
pubhc opinion was not ready to accept federation. It reported further that local pride and 
recent unsuccessful attempts to secure cooperation for the common good of all the West 
19West India Royal Commission Report, 57-58, 378-379. 
21 
Indian colonies made the idea of any large-scale political federation unfeasible. As an 
example the commission reported that witnesses, whom it described as well-infonned 
people, expressed the opinion that nothing beneficial to their colony could result from 
institutions established elsewhere in the West Indies. Despite this, the Moyne 
Commission recommended federation as the ideal to strive for in the West Indies.20 
Even during the war years the islands benefited from the recommendations made 
in the Moyne Commission report. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 
was a direct outcome of the report.21 This act promoted orderly social and economic 
planning for the islands on a c.omprehensive scale. Local governments fonnulated plans 
and Britain provided technical and financial assistance. For example, West Indian sugar 
colonies planned for the development of research in sugar technology. In addition, 
Jamaica started a food yeast factory, and planned for the rehabilitation of its banana 
industry. These programs were beyond the scope of Jamaica's own limited expertise and 
financial resources, so the island could not have initiated these programs without this 
assistance.22 
20 West India Royal Commission Report, 327; British Dependencies in the 
Caribbean, 1939-1952, 4; "Federation in the British Caribbean: An Exercise in Colonial 
Administration," Round Table 39 (June 1948), 234; Mordecai, The West Indies, 28-29. 
21 1t replaced the Colonial Development Act of 1929, which provided monetary 
advances to colonial governments to develop agriCUlture and industry. There was no 
money under this act for social programs. See West India Royal Commission Report, 
355. 
22Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947), 11,85. 
22 
The islands also enjoyed political advantages during the war. Progress generally 
took the form of an extension of the franchise, as recommended by the Moyne 
Commission. The British supported an expanded franchise in Barbados in 1943 which it 
accomplished by lowering income and property restrictions. In 1944, Jamaica gained full 
adult suffrage by eliminating the previous income restrictions, a new constitution, and an 
elected lower house, which gave the colony a substantial measure of self-government. 
The British granted universal suffrage to Trinidad in 1945.23 
Economic and political advances served to increase the desire for freedom in the 
islands, because they made th~ colonists believe that they had the ability to rule 
themselves. So did the West Indian war effort. Increased exports of sugar and cotton, the 
presence of American troops on military bases in the West Indies, and jobs for West 
Indians on the United States' bases and on the United States' mainland combined to raise 
the standard of living on the islands.24 All of the West Indian colonies made the 
monetary surpluses they built up available to Britain as interest-free wartime loans. 25 At 
the same time the West Indies contributed 5,500 ground troops to support the British, and 
23The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947, 15-16, 46-47; Mordecai, The West Indies, 32. 
24The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947,6-8, 10, 75. It was also true, however, that in 
Trinidad and Antigua so many residents took jobs on the American bases that a shortage 
of agricultural labor developed. This did not affect the overall positive economic picture 
on these island, however. See Great Britain, Colonial Office, Development and Welfare 
in the West Indies, 1943-44 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945), 10. 
25Barbados contributed L202,322, Jamaica 223,375, the Leeward Islands 37,262, 
Trinidad, which had a large American base, 929,095, and the Windward Islands 58,338, 
for a total ofLl,450,403 of the L24,014,948 given by all the British colonies together. 
See The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947,115. 
23 
West Indian men served in the Merchant Navy as wel1.26 
By the end of the war attitudes toward colonial rule in the West Indies mirrored 
those throughout the British Empire. The islands had made positive economic strides, 
gained some political concessions, contributed to the British war effort, and now expected 
a measure of independence in return. The West Indies colonies were different from other 
British colonies seeking independence, though. Here there was a deep-rooted 
commitment to the traditional British civil and political liberties with which the islands 
were so familiar. As far as the West Indians were concerned, they were British and they 
wanted to maintain their ties to Britain.27 
Britain also changed during the war. It emerged with both its economy and its 
colonial empire in disarray. The cost of the war left Britain deep in debt. Destruction 
was widespread. Hard currency was in short supply. The government had sold foreign 
assets to help finance the war effort. The civilian economy was in a state of upheaval, 
and the British people were demanding an enlarged social welfare program.2R 
The British had to consider the post-war supremacy of the United States as well. 
It was from the United States that the British hoped to get financial support to rebuild 
their country. In addition, they were cognizant of the United States' desire to end 
26The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947,9-10. 
27The British were aware that the islands retained strong ties to them. See 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 337 (1938),85, 132; Elisabeth Wallace, "The 
West Indies: Improbable Federation?" Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science 27 (November 1961),448. 
28Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 67-67; Don Taylor, The Years of 
Challenge: The Commonwealth and the British Empire, 1945-1958 (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 15,55-56. 
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colonial oppression and grant political freedom to all colonial peoples. This was 
particularly important in the West Indian colonies which were located in the United 
States' sphere of interest.29 
The end of the war brought political change to Britain as well. The Conservatives 
lost the election of 1945; the Labour Party received an overall majority at the polls for the 
first time in history. Yet though the Labour Party's pre-war pronouncements about 
colonial policy had differed substantially from those of the Conservative Party, in fact the 
new government changed few features of colonial administration. The Labour Party, in 
keeping with its traditional tenets and post-war anti-imperialist attitudes, supported a 
progressive colonial policy that encouraged self-government in the colonies. However, by 
the 1930s colonial discontent had forced the Conservative Party to the same position. It 
had begun already to improve economic conditions and support political development in 
the colonies. The Labour Party was able to continue from these beginnings, in keeping 
with its own traditional views. 30 
Although official government publications pointed to already successfully 
developed parliamentary institutions in places like Jamaica as examples of a long British 
29p. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 
1914-1990 (New York: Longman, 1993),277-278. 
30The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947,15-16,20-21; Great Britain, British 
Information Services, Britain and Her Dependencies (New York: Longmans Green and 
Company, 1943),39; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Origins and Purpose: A Handbook 
o/the British Commonwealth and Empire (London; His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1947),10,12; David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 10, 127-128; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 63-
65; Taylor, The Years o/Challenge, 13-14; "Federation in the British Caribbean," 234. 
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tradition of local self-government, the Labour government criticized what it called the 
halfway constitution of Jamaica. This was in accord with views widely held in Jamaica. 
Accordingly, the government of the island vowed to make more improvements and the 
Labour Party did as well.3 ! As soon as the war ended, the British took steps to forge a 
new relationship with its colonies in the West Indies. 
One of the problems of federation was apparent already from the crown colony 
system of government. The political units that resulted were a perfect example of the 
British tendency to treat the islands individually. Barbados did not convert to a crown 
colony, but instead retained its old representative government. In addition, the Leeward 
Islands differed constitutionally from the Windwards. The Leewards were a federation of 
units with local autonomy in all matters except those expressly delegated to the federal 
legislature. The Windwards were separate colonies united only by the fact of having a 
common governor. Trinidad and Jamaica each had individual crown colony 
governments. 32 
Although the British had proposed federation in the Caribbean before the Moyne 
Commission report did, their plans only involved the eastern Caribbean islands. Jamaica 
was excluded because of its distance from the other islands. The Moyne commissi.on was 
the first group to call for a Caribbean federation that included Jamaica. 
31Although Britain liked to point to Jamaica as a shining star in its colonial 
empire, it usually failed to mention that the island had long demanded even more political 
freedom than Britain was willing to give. See Origins and Purpose, 10, 12; Darwin, 
Britain and Decolonisation, 218-2 19; Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean, 173 . 
32West India Royal Commission Report, 325. 
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Another problem materialized during the Moyne Commission hearings when 
island representatives expressed their opinion that what was good for, and workable on, 
one island would not necessarily work for their own. They were reluctant, as well, to 
commit to the idea of a federation. In light of these views, the Moyne Commission 
recommendations were interesting. Although the report acknowledged that cooperation 
was not forthcoming and that the islanders were lukewarm to the idea of federation, it still 
endorsed federation for the islands. It was already becoming clear that the British could 
conceive of no other way to advance political freedom to this small group of island . 
However, by 1945, both the British and the West Indians had agreed that change was 
necessary. The British invited West Indian leaders to meet in Jamaica to discuss the idea 
of closer association among the colonies. 
CHAPTER III 
GEOGRAPHY AND CULTURE IN THE WEST INDIES 
The West Indies colonies that met to discuss federation in 1947 were a diverse 
group. They spanned thousands of miles from Jamaica, across the Caribbean Sea, to 
Trinidad. These distances were a potential problem for the fledging country. In addition, 
the islands had a wide variety of cultural traditions they had acquired from other 
European countries before they became British colonies. As we have seen, Spain and 
France had inhabited most of the islands at one time and their influence was still apparent 
in many places. The new federation would have to take these into consideration in 
forming a government. 
The distances between the small colonies were enormous. (See Map I , p. 28, and 
Table 3-1.) Jamaica was 990 miles northwest of Trinidad, the most southerly of the 
islands, and 1,050 miles from Barbados, the most easterly. St. Vincent and St. Lucia, of 
the Windwards group were located about 100 miles west of Barbados. The Leeward 
Islands were situated north of Barbados. These distances had caused the island colonies to 
b~ politically and administratively distinct throughout their histories. As the political 
history of the islands showed, the British treated their Caribbean individually and 
IMichael M. Horowitz, ed., Peoples and Cultures a/the Caribbean: An 
Anthropological Reader (Garden City, NY: The Natural History Press, 1971), iv. 
27 
Z4' 
~~RITISH 
HONDURAS 
,-..-....... 
1&:: --
"- .....-
123 
$' 
~~ 
CUBA 
<HI 
C> ~.~r:"Isn 15. 
~ • ) <t~ 
. ~ 
" ... ,~ 
~ q 
JIltrs 
;>00 
c:;> Do> Ccicos sndTurks Is. 
~ 
JAMAICA 
PUERTO Vil1lin ATLANTIC 
RICO Is. Anguilla 
• - 11 D ~ -)} 4>B~rbud~ 
St. Marti" \I ~ .., AntiZU<' 
St. Kltt5j 
/.1cntserrst tP. Guaddoop,1 Q 
~ £Xlmini08 
OCEAN 
CARIBBEAN SEA '\} Msrtiniquil Sl Luciata 
)\rub(l~. Cu (~~~() 
~ ~ 1J000oiro 
011 
'7-.:' 
SI. Vinc~tl> 
Grcn3cl3" 
o B8rbac'~ 
() Tobago 
.c£)Tlinfdad 
t-..> 
00 
29 
separately. They had different governors under the crown colony system, and their 
systems of government varied. Because separate governors handled the affairs of 
individual islands, they could, and did, often implement different policies on their own 
islands. Contributing to this isolation was the lack of air and sea transport, and 
insufficiently developed telecommunications.2 
TABLE 3-1 
AREA AND POPULA TrOW 
Total Area Total Population 
(sq. miles) (estimated thousands) 
Barbados ]66 192,800 
Jamaica 4,677 1,249,900 
Leeward Islands 
Antigua 171 41,800 
Montserrat 32 14,300 
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla ]53 46,200 
Trinidad and Tobago 1,980 558,000 
Windward Islands 
Dominica 305 47,600 
Grenada 133 72,400 
St. Lucia 238 70. \00 
S1. Vincent 150 6\,600 
Obviously, the British could do nothing about their traditional isolationist 
treatment of the islands; however the British and the colonists themselves could take 
measures to improve communications. As early as 1940 the Development and Welfare 
Organization in the West Indies realized that inter-island communications were a major 
2Great Britain, Colonial Office, Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 
1943-44 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945),3; British Dependencies in the 
Caribbean, 1939-1952, 1-2. 
3These popUlation figures were taken from the last census prior to the first 
meeting to discuss federation, 1943 in Jamaica and 1946 in all the other islands. See The 
West Indies, 49. 
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problem and examined ways to improve conditions. Regular steamship service existed 
already between the eastern Caribbean colonies, but did not extend to Jamaica.4 The 
British did not consider plans to extend sea transport important, because they believed 
that air service would become the principal mode of transportation in the future. In 1943 
the Development and Welfare Organization approved grants to construct airport landing 
facilities in the Windward and Leeward Islands. Those in Antigua, Grenada, S1. Kitts, S1. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent opened in 1943. Also in 1943, British West Indian Airways 
Limited began providing air service between these islands and Trinidad and Barbados. 1 n 
1944 the company extended its range of service to Jamaica. Although the airline got off 
to a shaky start, with frequent cancellations and delays, there was no question of 
disbanding the service.5 
By the time the delegates were preparing to meet to discuss federation in 1947 
there had been even more improvements in air traffic, although the shipping situation was 
still inadequate. British West Indian Airways expanded and improved its service. British 
Caribbean Airways also emerged as a carrier, as did Caribbean International Air Lines. 
Dominica and S1. Vincent still lacked regular air service, but the airlines were considering 
plans to remedy that problem. In addition, the British appointed a Director General of 
Civil Aviation to coordinate air activities. The participating governments of the British 
Caribbean colonies, in one of their first cooperative ventures in the 1940s, paid the 
4Development and Welfare, 1943-44,88; British Dependencies in the Caribbean, 
1939-1952,3. 
5Development and Welfare, 1943-44,88-89; West India Royal Commission 
Report, 339. 
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director's salary.6 Although air and sea communications were not perfect, it was clear 
that travel among the islands was reasonably assured by 1947.7 
Telecommunications among the islands had also been a problem for years. Little 
in the way of improvement occurred in this area in the 1940s. The same was true 
regarding attempts to establish a radio broadcasting system throughout the Caribbean.s It 
was clear, however, that the problem of communications, so often referred to as a major 
stumbling block to federation, was unlikely to be a problem by 1947. Although 
conditions were not perfect, there was slowly increasing radio service available to the 
islands, and there was certainly no reason to think that communications would deteriorate 
as the years progressed. 
Another major area of concern was the cultural diversity of the islands. (See 
Table 3-2.) Clearly, the islands had developed separately and individually, from a variety 
of beginnings, but in most the Spanish and French influence had long since lapsed. The 
Windward Islands were the only exception. They were the only part of the British 
Caribbean where the French language was still in use in some form. Although English 
was the official language in all the colonies, in Dominica and Grenada the inhabitants 
6Great Britain, Colonial Office, Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 
1947-49 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), 104-105. 
7By 1950 Development and Welfare Reports did not mention interisland 
communications as a specific area in need of development. See Great Britain, Colonial 
Office, Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 1950 (London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1951). 
8Development and Welfare, 1943-44,89-90; Development and Welfare, 1947-49, 
105- I 08. There was little change in 1950. See Development and Welfare, 1950, 91-92 . 
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spoke a French patois, and in St. Lucia the common language was a French-based Creole 
dialect.9 Even these colonies that maintained some visible remnant of French culture had 
been British colonies for hundreds of years. They had lived under British laws and 
customs since the nineteenth century. These were British colonies in every sense of the 
word, and any plans for federation would be based on British principles. \0 
TABLE 3-2 
BRITISH COLONIAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES)) 
British Colony European Language Religion 
Since Influences 
Barbados 1625 British English Anglican 
Jamaica 1655 British English Anglican 
Spanish Rastafarian 
Leeward Islands 
Antigua 1632 British English Anglican 
French 
Montserrat 1632 British English Anglican 
French 
St. Kitts-Nevis- 1623 British English Anglican 
Anguilla French 
Trinidad and 1797 British English Roman Catholic 
Tobago 
I 
Spanish Anglican 
French Muslim 
Dutch Hindu 
Windward Islands 1783 British Engl ish Roman Catholic 
Dominica French French Patois Anglican 
Grenada 1783 British English Roman Catholic 
French French Patois Anglican 
S1. Lucia 1814 British English Roman Catholic 
French French Creole Anglican 
St. Vincent 1783 British English Roman Catholic 
French Anglican 
• 9Annual Report on Dominica, 1948, 34; Suzanne Anthony, West Indies (New 
York: Chelsea House, 1989), 87, 97. 
IOGreat Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on Closer Association of the British 
West Indian Colonies, Part I, Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), 
11. 
llAnthony, West Indies , 10-17,75,82-88,93,96-101. 
BARBADOS 
JAMAICA 
LEEW ARD ISLANDS 
! ANTIGUA 
MONTSERRAT 
ST KITTS-NEVIS-
ANGUILLA 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
WINDWARD ISLANDS 
DOMfNICA 
GRENADA 
ST LUCIA 
ST VINCENT 
TABLE 3-3 
DISTRIBUTION BY RACIAL ORIGIN 
(IN THOUSANDS),2 
AFRICAN EAST I EUROPEAN I 
INDIAN 
148.9 0.1 9.8 
971.4 21.4 16.0 
35.4 0.7 
13.3 0.1 
40.0 0.1 0.9 
261.5 195.7 15.3 
11.9 O. J 
53.3 3.5 0.6 
40.6 2.6 0.3 
45.0 \.8 1.9 
MIXED OTHERS 
33.8 0.1 
232.2 8.8 
5.4 0.2 
0.9 
5.1 0.1 
78.8 6.7 
35.5 0.1 
14.8 0.2 
26.3 I 0.2 
12.6 0.3 
The British West Indies were also racially mixed (see Table 3-3). In all the 
islands, except Dominica, blacks were the predominant racial group. Those of mixed 
33 
race comprised the largest population group in Dominica and the second largest in all the 
other islands, except Trinidad where they were the third largest behind the East Indians. 
Trinidad had the largest East Indian population, a total of thirty-five percent of its 
popUlation. 13 
12Great Britain, Colonial Office, The West Indies: The Making of a Nation 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958),49. 
'3Mixed race peoples in the West Indies were mainly mixes of African and 
British. See Great Britain, British Information Services, Barbados (London: Central 
Office of Infonnation, 1966), 1-4; Great Britain, British Infonnation Services, Jamaica: 
The Making of a Nation (London: Cox & Sharland, Ltd., 1962), 1-3; Great Britain, 
British Dependencies in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, 1939-52 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), 81; Great Britain, British Information Services, 
Trinidad and Tobago: The Making of a Nation (London: British Government Reference 
Division, 1962),2-4; Suzanne Anthony, West Indies (New York: Chelsea House, 1989), 
27-32. 
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Although there was a racial consciousness on the islands, race was only one factor 
in a mix of cultural, economic, and political currents. In the British West Indies race was 
tied closely to class. The small European element on the islands, residents and colonial 
administrators, constituted the upper class. The mixed race peoples were primarily 
middle class. They were able to reach this position because their lighter skin made it 
more likely that the British would select them to fill the minor colonial posts open to the 
native population. Blacks formed the lower class in Caribbean society. Most of them 
made their livings in agriculture or seasonal work. 14 
These distinctions, however, were not necessarily permanent. There were 
opportunities for members of every class to improve their position. Because blacks were 
the lowest paid workers in the British Caribbean, they were the hardest hit by the 
economic downturn of the 1930s. The labor union leaders who rose to prominence 
during the late] 930s came from this black population. Members ofthe mixed race 
middle class joined these men in advocating the end of colonial rule. Many ofthese same 
men would become the political leaders of the 1940s and beyond. They would all playa 
major role in planning the federation. 15 Another group of blacks that would influence the 
14Barbados had a history of discriminating against blacks more than the other 
colonies, although there was no official system of segregation. See Bridget Brereton, 
"Society and Culture in the Caribbean: The British and French West Indies, 1870-1980," 
in Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer, eds., The Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Caroline Press, 1989),92-93; Scott B. MacDonald, 
Trinidad and Tobago: Democracy and Development in the Caribbean (New York: 
Praeger, 1986), 31-32. 
15For example, Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica, Eric Gairy of Grenada, Vere 
Bird of Antigua, and Robert Bradshaw of St. Kitts all began as labor leaders. See Frank 
McDonald, "The Commonwealth Caribbean," in Tad SzuIc, ed., The United States and 
the Caribbean (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 132. Perry C. Hintzen, 
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federation were the Oxford-educated leaders oftheir islands. They were motivated by a 
desire to free their homelands from colonial rule, as wel1. 16 
The most oppressed group in West Indian society was the East Indians. Since the 
time they arrived as indentured laborers to replace the freed blacks on the sugar 
plantations, black West Indians had looked down upon them for performing tasks they 
considered beneath their status. Because the East Indians chose to live in enclaves 
separate from the rest of the popUlation, cultural differences became stereotypes which 
persist today. In Trinidad, where they resided in numbers large enough to have a political 
impact, they seldom worked in cooperation with the black leaders. Most of the racial 
problems of the pre-federation and federation period were between the East Indians and 
blacks of Trinidad. 17 
The economies of the islands were similar; they were all largely agricultural. (See 
tables 3-4) Sugar was the principal export of all three of the largest islands. Trinidad 
and Tobago's oil industry was the only non-agricultural industry of consequence. IS 
"Trinidad and Tobago: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Construction of Racial 
Identity," in Carlene J. Edie, ed., Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 62. 
16 Grantley Adams of Barbados, Norman Manley of Jamaica, and Eric Williams of 
Trinidad were all Oxford-educated West Indians, who were labor leaders as well. See 
Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1964), 17. 
17 Jesse H. Proctor, Jr., "East Indians and the Federation of the British West 
Indies," India Quarterly 17 (October-December 1961),370-395; Area Handbook/or 
Trinidad and Tobago (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 89-90; 
Hintzen, "Trinidad and Tobago," 63. 
18Great Britain, Colonial Office, British Dependencies in the Caribbean and North 
Atlantic, J 939-1952 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), Appendices V, 
I 
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TABLE 3-4 
MAIN DOMESTIC EXPORTS BY QUANTITY AND VALUE 
BARBADOS, JAMAICA, TRINIDAD & TOBAG0 19 
QUANTlTY VALUE (L,OOO) 
1939 1950 1939 1950 
Barbados 
Sugar (tons) 128,594 131,743 1,278 3,868 
Molasses (000 gals.) 10,661 8,835 575 1,076 
Rum (000 gals.) 98 896 9 291 
Jamaica 
Sugar (tons) 104,000 222,000 990 5,934 
Rum (000 gals.) 839 2,363 247 1,559 
I 
Cigars (OOOs) 30(a) 15,037 17 564 
Cocoa (tons) 2,315 1,084 48 204 
Bananas (000 stems) 18,772 5,773 2,439 2,116 
Citrus Fruits & Juices --- --- 178 1,028 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Sugar (tons) 114,000 124,000 1,060 3,729 
Cocoa (tons) 7,479 7,231 253 1,742 
Rum (000 gals.) 183 1,166 21 430 
Bitters (000 gals.) 9 I 48 20 129 
Asphalt (000 tons) 59 47 168 257 
Petroleum 
Crude (million gals.) 8 82 40 1,787 
Refined (million gals.) 605 924 5,535 24,526 
(a) 000 lb. (b) not aVaIlable 
On the Leeward Islands of Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, sugar was the 
principal crop as well. Sea Island cotton was also an important export in the Leewards. 
In fact, it was the main crop of Montserrat. (See Table 3-5.) 
36 
The Windward Islands grew a wider variety of agricultural products than the other 
islands. Sugar was grown only on St. Lucia, where it was the principal crop. Dominica 
produced significant amounts of bananas and citrus fruits. Grenada relied heavily on 
IX, XII, XIII; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on the Leeward lsland'ifor the Years 
1949 & 1950 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951),21. 
'9British Dependencies in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, 1939-1953, 
Appendices V, IX, XIII. 
I 
spices for its income. On St. Vincent arrowroot, a medicinal herb, copra and Sea Island 
cotton were all important sources of income. (See Table 3-6.) 
TABLE 3-5 
MAIN DOMESTIC EXPORTS BY QUANTITY AND VALUE 
LEEWARD TSLANDS20 
QUANTITY VALUE (L 000) 
1939 1950 1939 1950 
Antigua 1 Sugar (tons) 21,000 28,000 195 959 
I 
Cotton (000 lb.) 247 840 15 I 135 
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla 
Sugar (tons) 36,000 39,000 373 1,120 
Salt (tons) --- 5,840 --- 17 
Molasses (000 gals.) 669 1,008 8 24 
Cotton (000 Ih.) 589 270 37 45 
Montserrat 
Cotton (000 lb.) (b) 362 (b) 313 
Citrus Fruits (b) --- (b) 18 
Vegetables (b) --- (b) I 
(a) 000 lb. (b) not avaIlable 
The fact that the West Indian islands were all agricultural economies was 
important in the British decision to seek federation there. The British believed that the 
island could never produced enough crops for export to support the economies of the 
individual islands. If, however, the islands could come together, as a whole they might 
37 
acquire enough power to compete with the more economically advanced countries of the 
world. 
2°British Dependencies in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, 1939-1952, 
Appendix XII; Report on the Leeward Islands, 1949 and 1950,21. 
TABLE 3-6 
MAIN DOMESTIC EXPORTS BY QUANTITY AND VALUE 
WINDWARD ISLANDS21 
QUANTITY VALUE (L 000) 
1939 1950 1939 1950 
Dominica 
Bananas (000 stems) 47 250 4 116 
Lime Juice (000 gals) 118 737 6 104 
Citrus Fruits --- --- 16 I 46 
Essential Oils (000 gals) 46(a) 47 12 40 
Vanilla (000 lb.) 11 34 5 39 
Cocoa (tons) 97 117 2 23 
Copra (tons) 223 678 2 31 
Grenada 
I Nutmegs (tons) 1,916 3,097 74 670 
Mace (tons) 334 326 49 151 
Cocoa (tons) 3,592 2,011 107 507 
St. Lucia 
Sugar (tons) 7,182 8,629 64 239 
Cocoa (tons) 160 258 4 53 
Copra (tons 579 1,054 5 52 
St. Vincent 
Arrowroot (tons) 
1 
5,251 2,831 132 196 
Copra (tons) 804 1,340 8 62 
Cotton (000 lb.) 606 469 49 85 
(a) 000 lb. (b) not avallable 
Although the West Indian colonies were divided in many ways, economic and 
structural problems were not a major obstacle to federation; it would be political 
problems that undermined the union. In 1945, though, the British believed that uniting 
could increase the economic power of the islands enough so that they could compete on 
the world market. This was enough to convince the leaders of the island colonies to 
explore the idea of some type of closer association. 
21British Dependencies in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, 1939-1952, 
Appendix XII. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MAKING OF A FEDERATION 
After World War II Britain advanced independence movements in many of its 
colonies. In the West Indies, they proposed the idea of federation for the islands, as they 
had done for years. At the same time, the West Indian islands had benefited from 
increased political freedom during the war, and, in conjunction with advancements in 
communications, this led to increased contact among the islands. These contacts, in turn, 
led to more discussions among the islanders about their options for independence. At the 
Montego Bay Conference in 1947, they opted for federation. 
In 1945, Oliver Stanley, the secretary of state for the colonies, in keeping with 
British promises, sent a dispatch to each of the West Indian colonies inviting them to 
meet and discuss a possible advance towards federation. I It was not until 1947 that the 
new secretary of state for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, took the next step by 
inviting the West Indian governments to meet at Montego Bay, Jamaica, to discuss 
whether the time was right to establish a federation. Arthur Creech Jones had extensive 
lGreat Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on the Closer Association of the 
British West Indian Colonies, Part 1: Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1948),4; Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947),45; John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal 
Negotiations (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), 31; Morley Ayearst, The 
British West Indies: The Searchfor Self-Government (New York: University Press, 
1960),231. 
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experience in colonial affairs. From 1936 to 1945 he had served as vice-chairman of the 
colonial office's Higher Education Conunission in West Africa. He was under-secretary 
of state for the colonies from 1945 to 1946, when he became colonial secretary.2 
Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Windward 
Islands sent representatives to the nine-day conference in September 1947. Each 
delegation was made up of three members nominated by their respective legislatures, 
except the Windward Islands delegation, which included one delegate from each of its 
four island. The chief legal and financial advisers of each colony accompanied the 
delegates. Although the British advised the islands to choose delegates who represented 
the range of views of their constituency that did not happen. Trinidad included an East 
Indian in its delegation, but he favored federation, unlike most East Indians on Trinidad. 3 
Creech Jones represented the British interests. He opened the conference by 
declaring that Britain no longer viewed its colonies as provinces for material exploitation. 
Instead it pictured them as free nations within the British Commonwealth. He went on to 
say that it was the task of the British government to create the conditions necessary for 
the political, social, and economic development of the colonies, so they could become 
2Great Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on the Closer Association of the 
British West Indian Colonies, Part 2: Proceedings (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1948),6; David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961 ( 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),14,387; Mordecai, The West Indies, 34. 
3The letter of 1945 invited the Bahamas, also, but it responded that it had no 
interest in a West Indian federation, so was not invited to Montego Bay. British Guiana 
and British Honduras did attend the conference, but neither ever agreed to participate in 
the federation. See Conference on Closer Association, Part 1, 4; Jesse H. Proctor, Jr., 
"East Indians and the Federation of the British West Indies," India Quarterly 17 
(October-December 1961), 374. 
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independent. In the case of the West Indies Creech Jones acknowledged that the British 
believed that collaboration was necessary to raise the living standards of the islands and 
to assure their prosperity as an independent nation. He pointed out the need to integrate 
separate territorial concerns and interests with the development of the West Indies as a 
whole. He stressed that individual islands could not meet their economic goals, or satisfy 
the needs of their people for education, housing, and medical care, without some kind of 
cooperative political venture, preferably federation. 4 
At the same time, Creech Jones was quick to stress that the British government 
was not urging closer union on the West Indies in order to shirk its own responsibilities to 
provide for the economic and social requirements of the islands. The goal, he said, was 
to provide the tools the islands needed to tackle their own problems. He promised to 
continue British monetary aid, as well as the research and technical assistance the 
Development and Welfare Act provided. In fact, he pledged to increase the benefits 
where necessary. 5 
The colonial secretary acknowledged that leaders of the individual colonies feared 
losing territorial autonomy to federation. He pointed out that the British government 
respected the need for domestic responsibility in the individual territories, and believed it 
should remain. He told the delegates that he did not believe that federation would 
interfere with the identity and individuality of the separate islands. He stressed that no 
4Creech Jones provided examples of other cooperative ventures in Africa and the 
Pacific as well. See Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 6-8. 
5Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 8. 
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island should dominate the federation, a fear the small islands shared. However, he was 
quick to point out the British government's view that in the post-war world no small 
territory could hope to survive and thrive on its own. On the other hand, a voluntary 
federation could provide a way for the small islands to continue to exist in freedom, 
within the community of islands that shared common goals. Creech Jones concluded that 
it was Britain's desire to keep the colonies within the Commonwealth as an independent 
nation. To that end he urged the island representatives to found a federation that could 
produce a sound economic foundation and strong democratic political organizations.6 
Most of the West Indian colonies supported federation from the beginning, but 
their delegates raised a number of concerns. H.A. Cuke, a member of the legislative 
council of Barbados, attested to a growing West Indies national spirit which he believed 
paved the way for cooperation, but he warned against forcing any island into a federation 
against its will. He called for more legislative and administrative responsibility for the 
islands in order to prepare them for federation. Grantley Adams, a member of the 
Barbadian House of Assembly, urged that the islands take immediate steps to initiate the 
process of federation, even though he acknowledged that Barbados, which possessed the 
most advanced constitution, would have to give up more jurisdiction than the other 
islands. He called for a federal system in which the islands maintained individual 
autonomy over all issues not directly charged to the federal government. W. A. 
Crawford, another member of Barbados' House of assembly, criticized Cuke for being 
6Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 9-10. 
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too cautious and endorsed the idea of federation. 7 
Jamaica's delegation was divided as well, although its house of representatives 
had voted to accept in principle the goal of federation. W.A. Bustamante, a member of 
the house, began by asking why the British had not offered the islands independence 
separately without federation. He claimed that independence was what the islands 
wanted, not a closer union. He called the proposed federation another form of bondage. 
He claimed that Jamaica was far more sound than most of the other islands and feared it 
would have to carry the weaker ones. Bustamante endorsed the idea of federation at 
some time in the future, but believed that the islands should be politically and 
economically more developed, more equal to each other, before that happened. D.1. 
Judah, a member of Jamaica's legislative council and F. A. Pixley, from the house, 
endorsed federation, but also urged that the islands move slowly to accomplish it, while 
the smaller islands matured politically. Norman Manley, who represented the British 
section of the Caribbean Commission at the conference, was a Jamaican. He spoke in 
favor of federation. He believed that federation was necessary if the West Indies were to 
prosper. He claimed that a federal government could develop regional plans to help an 
the islands. He called on the islands to accept the British offer of freedom through 
federation. 8 
Albert Gomes, a member of the legislative council of Trinidad, called for wider 
political representation for the islands. He claimed that the governments currently in 
7 Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 13-16, 37-45, 69-71. 
8Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 16-32, 54-62. 
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control were not representative of the islands' populations. He believed that political 
development was necessary for a successful federation. T. Roodal, another member of 
the legislative council of Trinidad and an East Indian, spoke with the majority of the 
island in favor of federation, but acknowledged that most East Indians disagreed with the 
idea of a British-dominated federation. He agreed, though, that the West Indies could not 
develop economically without federation and the application of federal resources, because 
no one island possessed what a federation could bring to the process of development. 9 
The Leeward Islands delegation included one representative of each island, who 
was a member of his own legislative council and the general legislative council of the 
Leeward Islands. v.c. Bird of Antigua called federation the only avenue to 
independence for his country. He applauded the fact that federation with self-government 
would remove Antigua's status as a subject nation and make it part of a responsible 
country. A.W. Griffin of Montserrat supported the principle of federation, but contended 
that the larger West Indies islands had a responsibility, even greater than that of faraway 
Britain, to provide aid to the smaller islands. 10 
The Windward Island delegation included one member from each island's 
legislative counciL A.M. Lewis of 8t. Lucia declared the island one hundred percent in 
favor of federation, although he urged that any federal government take into consideration 
8t. Lucia's French-based legal system when fonnulating legal policies for the federation. 
He wanted to be sure that 8t. Lucia retained the right to vote for any prospective changes. 
9Conference on Closer Association, Part 2,64-69,93-94. 
IOConference on Closer Association, Part 2, 45-59, 56-57. 
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F.A. Bonadie from St. Vincent endorsed federation as well, because he believed that it 
was the only way to assure a true political destiny for the small islands. He stressed that 
St. Vincent intended to bear its full financial share for the federal operation and would not 
be a burden on the rest of the federation. J.B. Renwick of Grenada claimed his island was 
strongly in favor of West Indian federation, stating that it would be both politically and 
economically beneficial to every colony. C.A.H. Dupigny of Dominica endorsed 
federation as well. In fact, he claimed that Dominica left the Leeward Islands group, 
which operated as a federation, in an attempt to dissolve it and in so doing make room for 
a West Indies federation. He said that as the representative of an island that had been part 
of a federation, he recommended it. 11 
The delegates' statements emphasized two important issues. Their criticisms of 
British policy were the first widespread anti-imperialist attitudes the islands had 
expressed. Although islanders had been critical of British policies during the riots of 
1930s and in their calls for independence after the war, previous critiques had focused on 
attaining goals of increased economic, social, and political power. Now Barbados, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad openly criticized the British for failing to give them the political 
power they needed to become independent. The smaller islands were still less critical of 
the British. They focused more on the idea of federation, because they believed it was the 
only way they would ever attain freedom from Great Britain. 
The second issue was the concept of federation itself. It was already apparent 
that the larger and smaller islands had different concerns. The larger island delegations 
"Conference on Closer Association, Part 2,33-37,49-51, 88. 
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were divided on the idea of federation, but none portrayed it as the only way to attain 
freedom from Great Britain. The smaller islands were united in their support of 
federation. They acknowledged that their chance of attaining freedom without it were 
slim. British Guiana voted against the idea of federation and never joined. British 
Honduras voted to continue to consider the idea, but they never joined either. 12 
Despite some of their disagreements, though, the ten islands of the Caribbean 
were able to reach a unanimous decision on all of the resolutions. They agreed to 
establish a political federation of the British Caribbean territories on the Australian 
model, "in which each constituent unit retains complete control over all matters except 
those specifically assigned to the federal government.,,13 They voted to give the unit 
governments increased responsibility for political development as an aim in itself. They 
committed themselves to increased communications among the islands, and to the 
development of agriculture. In addition, the representatives put in place measures to 
further foster international trade. 14 
To handle the pressing problem of developing a working federation, the 
12Conference on Closer Association, Part 2,105-106,109-112. 
DFor the West Indians the Australian model meant that the individual islands 
would maintain most of the power within the federation. Elisabeth Wallace pointed out, 
however, that the islands would not actually follow the Australian model because they 
would not give their federal government the power to tax which allowed authority to 
gravitate to the center in Australia. See Elisabeth Wallace, "The West Indies: 
Improbable Federation?" Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 27 
(November 1961),444. 
14British Guiana voted against the idea of federation, and never joined. British 
Honduras voted to continue to consider the idea, but they never joined either. Co'?ference 
on Closer Association, Part 2, 105-106, 109-112. 
participants established a Standing Closer Association Committee to draft a federal 
constitution. They appointed a commission to examine the question of establishing a 
customs union and to make recommendations to the islands as well. This commission 
urged the island governments to establish another committee to study and report upon 
matters of common economic significance, and to advise upon plans for economic 
development. 15 
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The conference endorsed a recommendation to establish a unifonn currency for 
the federation, a common financial year, and a unified public service sector. It asked the 
British government to examine "the possibility of effecting changes in the methods of 
Treasury control of grant-aided Colonies," including the idea of substituting a block grant 
for three years to the affected territories, thus freeing them from yearly budgetary control 
by the Crown. In a move not lUlexpected for a group that was detennined to maintain its 
ties to Britain, the delegates ended by declaring their allegiance to the king. '6 
When the conference adjourned, the local legislatures met to discuss its 
recommendations. In Barbados the House of Assembly enthusiastically supported the 
idea of federation by unanimously adopting the resolutions. The Legislative Council took 
a more cautious approach, though. It decided to await the report of the Standing Closer 
Association Committee (see below) before offering an opinion on political federation. In 
Jamaica, both the Legislative Council and the House of Representatives agreed to accept 
the resolutions, as did the Legislative Council and the Legislature of Trinidad and 
15Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 106-108. 
16Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 108-109, 112. 
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Tobago. 17 
In the Leeward Islands, the Legislative Council of Antigua accepted the 
resolutions, and introduced legislation to amend the Constitution to pennit universal adult 
suffrage without financial and property qualifications, and a larger elected representation. 
The Legislative Council of St. KittslNevisl Anguilla voted to accept the resolutions. IS 
In the Windward Islands the legislatures of St. Lucia and St. Vincent accepted the 
resolutions as written. In Grenada the Legislative Council decided to await the report of 
the Standing Closer Association Committee before making a final decision on the 
feasibility of federation. Dominica agreed to the resolutions, as long as the federation 
would accept the island as a separate constituent unit. 19 In these various responses to the 
conference recommendations, the islands showed their diversity once again. Although 
they generally agreed to support the federation of the West Indies, the small islands 
believed it was necessary to attach stipulations or reserve final judgment. 
At Montego Bay the delegates created the Standing Closer Association 
Committee as a permanent body to study the problems connected with creating the 
federation and make recommendations to the island legislatures. The committee was 
17Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on Jamaica/or the Year 1948 
(London: His Majesty ' s Stationery Office, 1950), 111; Great Britain, Colonial Office, 
Annual Report on Trinidad and Tobago. B. WI.. for the Year J 947 (London: His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), 2; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on 
Trinidad and Tobagofor the Year 1948 (London: His Majesty ' s Stationery Office, 
1950),3; "B.W.I. Legislatures Discuss Proposals for Federation," Caribbean Commission 
Monthly Information Bulletin 2 (March 1948), 21-22. 
18"B.W.I.," 22. 
19Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on Dominica, B. WI, for the Year 
1948 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), 3; "B. W.I.," 22. 
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composed of one member from each of the legislatures of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands, and two representatives of the other island legislatures, along with a British 
chairman and secretary appointed by the secretary of state for the colonies. The Standing 
Closer Association Committee began its meetings in November 1948, and presented its 
report in October 1949. The committee, commonly called the Rance committee after its 
chainnan, Sir Hubert Rance, recommended a bicameral legislature consisting of an 
entirely elected House of Assembly based on universal adult suffrage. The number of 
seats designated to each island was based on population, but not strictly. The committee 
decided that the larger population areas should have more representatives, but chose not 
to use population as a basis of representation because that would allow Jamaica to 
dominate the House. Under its proposal Jamaica's representatives would still make up 
the largest contingent with sixteen members, but the delegation would not be large 
enough to dominate the federation. Trinidad would have nine representatives, followed 
by Barbados with four. Antigua, St. Kitts, Grenada, S1. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica 
would each get two representatives. Montserrat would have only one?O The governor-
general would be the head of the executive branch of the federal government. He would 
represent the king, who would appoint him. With a council of state to advise him, the 
20The committee included six representatives for British Guiana and two for 
British Honduras as well, but these were eliminated before the federation began. Great 
Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Caribbean Standing Closer Association 
Committee, 1948-49 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950),26-33; 
Conference on Closer Association, Part 2, 103-104; Mordecai, The West Indies, 39. 
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governor-general would appoint members to the Senate.21 The committee recommended 
that members of the federal House or Senate be proscribed from serving concurrently in a 
unit legislature or unit executive council, although, as we saw in the Leeward Islands, its 
representatives served in both unit and federal govemments.22 The issues of the number 
of delegates representing each island and dual federal-local service in the legislature 
remained controversial and subject to debate for years. 
As to relations between the federal government and the constituent territories, the 
committee was clear: "Geography alone suggest the wisdom of not attempting too close 
or all-embracing a Federation for this widely scattered region.,m It stressed that the 
federal government was not meant to rule over the territorial governments. The territories 
would keep all their powers except those specifically granted to federal administration. 
The areas under federal control, referred to as the exclusive list, consisted of such things 
as defense, external affairs, federal agencies and institution for research and 
investigations, for professional and technical training and for the promotion of special 
studies, federal courts, federal law, interpretation of federal legislation, federal elections, 
raising loans outside the federation, and federal public services. The committee issued 
what it called the concurrent list as well, which included issues on which both the federal 
and territorial governments could legislate, such as aviation, aliens, arbitration, banking, 
census, copyrights, criminal law and penal administration, currency, development of 
21Standing Closer Association Committee, 30, 34-35, 38, 44; Mordecai, The West 
indies, 39-40. 
22Standing Closer Association Committee, 82, 88. 
23 Standing Closer Association Committee, 16. 
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industries, fisheries, immigration, import duties, marriage and divorce, postal services, 
shipping and navigation, telecommunications, trade and commerce, and trade unions. 24 
The committee itself acknowledged that important issues were absent from the 
lists and thus left to local control, including agriculture, education, housing, and the 
maintenance of public order. It asserted that these functions were more appropriately left 
to local control, citing the example set by Great Britain in regard to the division of 
authority between the central and local governments. 25 
Barbados 
Jamaica 
Leeward Islands 
Antigua 
St. Kitts-Nevis 
Montserrat 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Windward Islands 
Dominica 
Grenada 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
TOTALS 
TABLE 4-1 
CUSTOMS RECEIPTS FOR 1947-4826 
(Ls) 
Total Revenue Customs Receipts 
1,869,916 680,082 
8,848,775 3,894,202 
327,237 125,001 
360,546 116,000 
54,632 22,743 
7,678,876 2,447,055 
191,116 70,000 
540,654 172,960 
252,505 103,000 
282,490 98,235 
24,800,128 9,423,646 
Customs Receipts as % 
of Total Revenue 
36% 
44% 
38% 
32% 
42% 
34% 
37% 
32% 
40% 
35% 
38% 
The committee proposed that the islands use customs receipts to finance federal 
government operations. The committee firmly rejected any notion of voluntary, direct, 
24Standing Closer Association Committee, l6-17, 79-81; Mordecai, The West 
indies, 40. 
25Standing Closer Association Committee, 18. 
26Standing Closer Association Committee, 73 . 
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contributions from the islands, because it believed that would place the federal 
government in a position subordinate to the local territories and thus make it ineffective. 
Instead, the federal government would collect all customs duties, but return any money 
not used back to the territories. Based on 1947-48 figures, the committee determined that 
the West Indies Federation could expect L9,423,646 from customs receipts. 27 (See Table 
4-1.) 
The committee recommended Trinidad as the site of the federal capital. It offered 
no explanation for this decision. 28 With that final recommendation, it reported that it had 
designed a document that it believed would constitute the shortest path to political 
independence within the British Commonwealth for the West Indies islands. Until the 
federation was able to stand alone, the committee agreed it would have to rely on Britain 
for economic assistance. However, the committee stipulated that Britain must give the 
federation the freedom to initiate and administer its financial and economic, as well as its 
political, affairs. The federation had to be self-reliant as much as possible.29 
The islands' response to the work ofthe committee was generally positive. The 
legislatures of Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Windward Islands of 5t. Lucia, S1. Vincent, 
Dominica, and Grenada adopted resolutions favoring political federation based on the 
report, but the Grenada legislature decried the absence of a proposal for eventual self-
government. In Barbados the legislature accepted the report, although it declared that 
27Standing Closer Association Committee, 19-20. 
28Standing Closer Association Committee, 48. 
29Standing Closer Association Committee, 23-25. 
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under the structure proposed the federation would be nothing but a glorified colony. In 
addition, Barbados opposed Trinidad as the capital site, fearing that entrenched 
commercial interests there would exert too much control over the operations of the 
federation. 3D In the Leeward Islands the legislatures of Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla accepted the recommendations unanimously. The Montserrat Legislative 
Council accepted the report as well, but with the provision that its own representation be 
increased from one to twO?1 
By this time the islands' anti-colonial attitudes were more apparent. Even the 
small islands were calling for more political independence. Still, even now, the islands 
maintained their commitment to Britain and its traditions. 
With these final votes the idea of federation became a reality. Still, the islands 
continued to disagree on some important points, which they would have to settle before 
they could complete the final steps toward formalization of the federation. 
30Great Britain, British Information Services, The British Colonial Territories in 
1950 (London: British Government Reference Division, 1951), 63; Great Britain, 
Colonial Office, The Colonial Territories, 1951-52 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1952),32; Mordecai, The West Indies, 41-42. 
31Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on the Leeward l<ilandsfor the Years 
1949 and 1950 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), 7. 
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CONTROL OF THE FEDERATION 
With the plan for a federation in place, the West Indies colonies were now in a 
position to make final preparations for its realization. However, there were still some 
issues remaining that would require a great deal of cooperation on the part of the islands. 
Two important concerns that emerged from the Conference on Closer Association in 
1947 involved the extent of control anyone island could exercise over the others in the 
federation. The first was representation in the federal House of Representatives. Despite 
the Standing Closer Association recommendation, the islands would continue to debate 
the matter. The second, and more divisive issue, was the choice of the site for the federal 
capitaL Although it seemed that this should be a fairly easy decision, in fact the debate 
focused attention on the issue of trust among the islands. No colony wanted to see 
another one in a position to dominate the federation. 
The Standing Closer Association Committee had already acknowledged the 
islands' concerns about granting too much power to anyone entity in it allocation of seats 
to the federal House of Representatives. The committee stressed the fact that it did not 
expect the islands to act or vote as a single block, but rather believed that party lines 
would develop that would cut across territorial divisions. However, it also vowed to 
avoid even the possibility that a proposal would appear to foster domination of the 
54 
-55 
federation by one entity, and for that reason declined to use population as the basis for 
establishing seating to eliminate the possibility that Jamaica could dominate. I 
From this point on the islands came together in a series of ad hoc conferences to 
discuss committee reports and specific issues that continued to plague the pre-federal 
negotiations. The island legislatures chose the delegations that attended the conferences, 
which typically included the islands' prime minister plus elected members of its 
legislature.2 As the islands gained more control over their own local governments, their 
potential delegate choices widened, so the participants varied from one conference to 
another. Many names appeared on every list, though.J However, three men came to 
dominate the conference process after the first, less contentious, meeting in London in 
1953: Grantley Adams, Norman Manley, and Eric Williams. 
Adams participated in the federal process from the beginning. He represented his 
home island of Barbados at Montego Bay in 1947. He was an Oxford-educated lawyer 
who served in the Barbados House of Assembly from 1934 to 1958. In 1958 he became 
the prime minister of the West Indies Federation. He founded the Barbados Labour Party 
I Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer 
Association Committee, J 948-49 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950),33-
34. 
2The British attended the conferences as well, but they did not participate in the 
debates unless asked, and never cast a vote. After the 1953 London Conference, Grantley 
Adams told the Barbados Assembly that nothing had been forced on the delegates by the 
Colonial Office, which had stressed that it was for West Indians to create their own 
constitution. See Elisabeth Wallace, The British Caribbean: From the Decline of 
Colonialism to the End of Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 109. 
3John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968),467-469. 
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in 1938, and became first vice-president of the West Indies Federal Labour Party in 1956. 
Adams favored federation for Barbados and the West Indies, and worked tirelessly to 
make the idea a reality.4 
Norman Manley's history was very similar to Adams'. He was an Oxford-
educated lawyer with a long history of political activity in Jamaica. Although he attended 
the Montego Bay Conference as a member of the British delegation, he spoke as a 
Jamaican in favor of federation. By 1949 he was the leader of the opposition in Jamaica. 
From 1955 to 1959 he served as prime minister. In 1959 his title changed to premier, a 
position he held until 1962. Manley founded the People's National Party of Jamaica in 
1938 and the West Indies Federal Labour Party in 1956. He served as president ofboth. 5 
Eric Williams was the only federation leader without a long history in the West 
Indies labour unions. He was an Oxford-educated professor of Social and Political 
Science at Howard University in Washington, D.C. from 1939 to 1945. In 1945 he joined 
the Caribbean Commission and served as deputy chairman of its Caribbean Research 
Council from 1948 to 1955. In 1955 he became active in Trinidad politics. He founded 
the People's National Movement in January of that year. In 1959 he became chief 
minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and its premier in 1961.6 
4Wallace, The British Caribbean, 29-30, 33-34, 64, 143-146; Mordecai, The West 
Indies, 467. 
5Wallace, The British Caribbean, 37-42, 99-100,113,127,137, 144, 154; 
Mordecai, The West Indies, 467. 
6Williams work on the British legacy in the West Indies continues to interest 
historians. See Seymour Drescher, "Eric Williams, British Capitalism and British 
Slavery," History and Theory 26 (1987), 180-196; Wallace, The British Caribbean, 54, 
115,133-134,158,199-202; Mordecai, The West Indies, 469. 
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After the island voted to accept the Standing Closer Association Committee's 
recommendations of 1949, they decided to meet to discuss the issues that needed 
amendment. In 1953 Oliver Lyttelton, the current secretary of state for the colonies, 
invited the islanders to meet in London. The West Indians decided to eliminate the 
Senate and House seats assigned to British Guiana and British Honduras until these 
countries decided formally to join the federation. They adjusted the number of seats 
allocated to each island, although again they did not base their decision on population. 
According to the new numbers, Jamaica would have seventeen representatives, one more 
than the original proposal. Trinidad would also increase its representation, to ten, and 
Barbados to five, while the rest of the islands would still have two, except Montserrat 
which would retain one seat.7 These figures increased the large-island representation, but 
still they did not allow anyone island to dominate the federation. 
When it came to the selection of the capital site, the Standing Closer Association 
Committee had chosen Trinidad, but offered no explanation for its selection. In the 1953 
London meeting, the island delegates rejected the committee's proposal, because the 
small islands feared that having the capital in Trinidad would increase the inevitably large 
influence of what was already the richest island. Instead, they decided to choose one of 
the smaller islands, focusing their discussion on Antigua, St. Lucia, and Grenada. They 
believed that the federal government could operate better on a smaller island where they 
7Great Britain, British Information Services, The West Indies: A Nation in the 
Making (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958),12; "British West Indian 
Leaders Accept Federation Proposals," Caribbean Commission Monthly Information 
Bulletin 6 (April 1953), 202. This was the only one of the series of meetings that 
Williams did not attend. 
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thought there might be less interference from the local government. It was clear from the 
debate, which went on for days, that the smaller islands feared the power one of the larger 
islands could wield if one of them became the seat of government for the fe-deration. The 
delegates selected Grenada this time; they did not explain why, beyond the fact that it met 
their criterion of being a small island. 8 
Still, though, the matter was not settled. Representatives from the islands raised 
the issue again at another meeting in London in 1956. They had come together once 
more because there were still matters that they had not agreed on. This time they 
debated both their own criteria, that is, whether to choose a large island or a small one, 
and the actual choice. Williams of Trinidad maintained that the capital should be one of 
the larger islands, either Jamaica or Trinidad, because a small island lacked efficient 
communications and accommodations to support the capital. Manley of Jamaica 
continued to lobby for a smaller island, but preferred Antigua to Grenada, because access 
to Grenada by sea or air was severely limited. When they were unable to reach a decision 
even on the criteria for selection of a capital site, the delegates decided to appoint a fact-
finding commission composed of three non-West Indians to nominate three sites in order 
of preference. They proposed that at least one architect and one financial expert sit on the 
commission.9 
8Standing Closer Association Report, 48; "British West Indian Leaders Accept 
Federation Proposals," Caribbean Commission Monthly Information Bulletin 6 (April 
1953),202; Mordecai, The West Indies, 46,54; Wallace, The British Caribbean, 115-116. 
9Wallace, The British Caribbean, 116; Mordecai, The West Indies, 54-55. 
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Francis Mudie, a British West Indian expatriate, chaired the three-member 
commission, which met the islands' specifications. The Mudie Commission established 
what it called a twin-site premise for the capital, which established that the federal capital 
should be based on or near an existing island capital with good roads, communications, 
health and educational services, cultural and entertainment institutions, and a high level 
of public services. These criteria immediately eliminated the small islands of the 
Leeward and Windward groupS.1O 
The Mudie Commission chose Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad as options for the 
capital site. It relegated Trinidad to third place because of widespread and generally 
tolerated corruption in public life there. It described Trinidad as politically backward 
compared to Jamaica or Barbados, because Trinidad had. no clear-cut political parties. In 
addition, it cited the large percentage of East Indians as a disturbing element because 
many of that population opposed federation, and further claimed that political 
fragmentation and racial unrest made the island politically unstable. Not only 
Trinidadians, but West Indian islanders from across the Caribbean, took offense at this 
portion of the report. They accused the committee of failing to offer evidence to support 
its opinion, and of attempting to saddle the newly elected government with past 
problems. I I 
IOThe fact-finding commission was commonly referred to as the Mudie 
Commission. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Chaguaramas Joint 
Commission (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), 1; Mordecai, The West 
Indies, 66-67. 
II During his campaign for prime minister in 1956 Williams had attacked the 
corruption of Trinidadian politics, which he called dishonest and immoral, but he claimed 
to be outraged by this report. See Eric Williams, Inward Hunger: The Educaiton of a 
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Contrary to the islanders' protests, there was some validity to the report. 
Although there was no evidence of the widespread corruption it reported on the island, 
the other claims had some merit. The East Indian popUlation remained divided on the 
issue of federation, and that resulted in the political fragmentation to which the report 
alluded. On the other hand, the East Indians were not actively working against the 
federation. The political opposition was continuing to watch the process carefully to 
assure that its constituents would not received unfair treatment in a united West Indies. 
As to the racial unrest, it had been a problem between the East Indians and the blacks for 
a long time. The federation process had not enhanced nor eliminated the tension. It had 
never disrupted the Trinidadian government, so there was no reason to expect that it 
would cause problems for the federation. 12 
Jamaica was the second choice ofthe Mudie Committee, which pointed to the 
distance from the other islands as the primary reason for not making it their first 
selection. The committee believed that because Jamaica was so far removed from the 
other islands, it knew little about the eastern islands. In the committee's opinion having 
the capital would allow Jamaica to control the federation, while ignoring the opinions of 
the remaining islands. 13 
The Mudie Committee recommended Barbados as the seat of the new federal 
government. Barbadians had both knowledge of, and close connections to, the other 
Prime Minister (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 174; Wallace, The British 
Caribbean, 116; Mordecai, The West Indies, 67-68. 
12Wallace, The British Caribbean, 116. 
13Wallace, The British Caribbean, 116; Mordecai, The West Indies, 67. 
-islands, plus the highest general level of education in the federating territories. It was 
also large enough to support a federal capital near an existing metropolitan area, which 
satisfied the twin-site concept. The fact that it was the most British of the West Indies 
islands might have influenced the committee's decision as well. 14 
The islanders met again in Jamaica in 1957, to review the Mudie Committee 
report. Although they denounced its conclusions, they agreed to accept its twin-town 
concept, which meant that the only islands remaining under consideration would be 
Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad. They agreed further that the chosen island should 
commit itself to providing one thousand acres, three to seven miles from an existing 
town, for the federation capitaL In addition the delegates demanded that in order to be 
considered the islands must commit to providing water, electricity, and other public 
utilities to the federal capital on a priority basis. All three agreed. 15 
Each of the three islands had a representative at the meeting who made a bid for 
the capital. Williams, the newly elected prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, 
denounced the allegations against Trinidad in the commission's report. He claimed that 
race relations in Trinidad were no more divisive than in the other islands. He promised 
that if the delegates chose Trinidad, the governor would vacate Government House for 
the federal governor, until a federal site was ready.16 In addition, a representative of the 
14Mordecai, The West Indies, 67-68. 
15 Report a/the Chaguaramas Joint Commission, 1; Mordecai, The West Indies, 
68-69. 
16Wallace, The British Caribbean, 116; Mordecai, The West Indies, 69. 
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East Indian community from Trinidad proclaimed that group's loyalty to the new 
federation. 17 Adams warned that if the delegates chose one of the more industrialized 
islands, they would be giving it the power to dominate the smaller territories. In addition, 
he argued that in the larger islands jealousy might arise between the local and federal 
governments in competition with each other, which might lead them to ignore the smaller 
units. 18 Norman Manley of Jamaica countered that no island could hope to dominate the 
federal government because the number of seats allocated in the House of 
Representatives precluded that. He urged the delegates to select Jamaica. 19 
In just two votes the delegates selected Trinidad as the federation's capital. It was 
a secret ballot, but the records show that five of the seven small islands and Jamaica 
voted for Trinidad. In doing so they ignored Adams' warning about the possibility of 
feuding between the local and federal governments, which would occur within a year. 20 
They also failed to choose Jamaica, which was the weak link in the federation because of 
its distance from the others, and also because there had been more opposition to 
federation on that island than any of the others. In addition, the other islands feared that 
'7Mordecai, The West Indies, 70. 
'8Mordecai, The West Indies, 69-70. 
'9Mordecai, The West indies, 70. 
200n the first ballot Jamaica received the lowest number of votes, four, so was 
eliminated as a choice. On the second ballot it threw its support to Trinidad. See Report 
of the Chaguaramas Joint Commission, 1; The West indies, 11; Mordecai, The West 
Indies, 70. 
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they would be ignored with the capital so far away.21 
Although the representation issue and the capital site controversy appeared 
insignificant in many respects, they were indicative of the lack of trust existing among the 
islands. This apprehension would contribute to other issues the islands faced along the 
path to federation. 
21Wallace, The British Caribbean, 117; Mordecai, The West Indies, 70-71; 
Williams, Inward Hunger, 204. 
-CHAPTER VI 
FINANCING THE FEDERATION 
Financing the federation was a problem for the West Indian islands throughout the 
pre-federation process.' It highlighted another divisive issue as well: would the islands 
benefit enough from the central government to offset the cost of financing it, particularly 
when the money to support the federal government would have to come from the limited 
resources of the islands themselves? For the small islands in particular, the federation 
plan would require them to take any money they contributed to the federal structure 
directly from revenues already used to finance their own local government. The larger 
islands, on the other hand, were afraid that their contributions would be subsidizing those 
of the smaller units, and that they would be paying significantly more than their fair share 
to support the federal government. Once again, the units debated the issue at a series of 
conferences. 
'In addition to the proposals discussed in this chapter, the issue of Britain's 
contribution to the federation and the unit governments also raised some questions. 
However, these did not contribute directly to the problems among the islands concerning 
the proposed federation. In essence, Britain agreed to continue the grants-in-aid it already 
provided to St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, and Montserrat. It promised as well to 
continue to provide development and welfare grants where necessary in the British 
Caribbean. These contributions would continue for at least ten years. For more 
information see Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Plan for a British Caribbean 
Federation: Report o/the Fiscal Commissioner (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1955),42-55. 
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At Montego Bay the delegates rejected the idea of annual contributions from the 
islands to finance the federation, and instead proposed the use of customs duties. 2 The 
Standing Closer Association Committee agreed with these recommendations and 
expanded upon them. It proposed the establishment of a customs union to include a free 
trade area, uniform tariffs, and a single customs administration, which it described as the 
fOlmdation of a federal structure. The committee concluded that customs revenues would 
comprise approximately thirty percent of the total revenue of the region, which would 
more than suffice to finance the federal government in its first years of operation. 
Therefore, they recommended that the federal government return at least seventy-five 
percent of the money to local governments to help defray their own substantial expenses.] 
When the island delegates met in London in 1953 to review the committee's 
report, they agreed that it was an acceptable fiscal basis for federation but decided to 
adjust the plan. for financing the federal government. They reduced the percentage of 
customs revenue allocated to the federal government from twenty-five to fifteen percent. 
They assumed that ten percent of that would cover federal costs and they added the other 
five percent for unexpected expenses and reserves. They agreed that this proportion 
2Great Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on the Closer Association ofLhe 
British West Indian Colonies, Part 1: Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1948), 15. 
3Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer 
Association Committee, 1948-49 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), 19-
20, 100. The committee recommended that postal services come under the control of the 
federal government and that the government use income from it and any other services 
within its jurisdiction to finance operations. However, these did not raise the same 
concerns that the proposed customs union did. See Standing Closer Association 
Committee Report, 1948-49, 20-21, 100. 
I 
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should be calculated after the costs of collection were deducted. At the same time they 
agreed to an independent inquiry to establish annual federal costs more finnly. They 
anticipated that the investigation could actually reduce further the costs to the islands of 
supporting the federal govenunent. 4 
In June of 1955 the colonial secretary appointed a fiscal commission, called the 
Caine Commission and made up of financial representatives of the islands, to conduct the 
inquiry into the costs of financing the West Indies federal government, and it issued its 
report later that year. The Caine commission began by criticizing the basis for the 
analysis made at the London Conference of 1953. It charged that the previous report had 
underestimated costs and revenues when preparing its estimates. The fiscal commission 
amended the previous report by recommending that local governments calculate the 
percentage of import duties due the federal government before it made deductions for the 
cost of collection. After the federation took on the responsibility for collection itself, the 
islands would continue proportionally to share the costs of collection. 5 
The report went on to analyze what could be expected in terms of receipts from 
customs duties. The commission based its figures on customs duties collected on imports 
from outside the federation area in 1954, rather than total receipts that included inter-
island trade, which the previous committee had used. The fiscal commission estimated 
that the total revenue would be L 1 0.7 million, fifteen percent of which would amount to 
4"British West Indian Leaders Accept Federation Proposals," Caribbean 
Commission Monthly Information Bulletin 6 (April 1953),202. 
SReport a/the Fiscal Commissioner, v, 20; Elisabeth Wallace, The British 
Caribbean: From the Decline o/Colonialism to the End 0/ Federation (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1977), 111. 
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L 1.6 million. This would fall significantly short of the amount envisaged by the London 
Conference delegates. It would also fall sho.rt of the commission's estimated budget 
requirements of the federal government, which it calculated at L2.081 million.6 
The commission's chief criticism of the customs union proposed at the London 
Conference was the role the unit governments would play in its operation. Instead of 
being uniform, the individual islands would set the customs duties on individual revenue 
items, which therefore would vary widely in different units according to the importance 
of certain items in individual territories. As an example the report used beer 
consumption. In Jamaica, the islands traditionally favored locally brewed beer, from 
which no custom duty would accrue. St. Lucians, on the other hand, drank imported beer, 
I 
for which they would pay a customs duty. The commission contended that similar I ) . 
t, 
!! 
I 
examples could be multiplied indefinitely, with the result that local governments would 
have an incentive to substitute other revenues for customs duties wherever possible, t 
because the plan also called for local administration of the customs union. The federal 
government would have no power to control local decisions, and even if it did, it could 
only increase its own revenue at the direct expense of local revenues. 7 
The commission instead recommended a completely different way to finance the 
federation that did not require joint federal and local interaction and cooperation. First, 
the commission recommended that the federal government receive the profit from 
currency. Profits would accrue because the currency was based on sterling deposited in a 
6Report o/the Fiscal Commissioner, 13-16,21. 
7Report o/the Fiscal Commissioner, 25-26, 29-30. 
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sterling security fund in London. The sterling security fund was invested in securities, 
where it could earn a profit. The eastern islands had apportioned this revenue among the 
territories participating in their unified currency plan already.s The amount derived from 
anyone territory varied with the amount of money in circulation, and so was roughly 
equivalent to the wealth of the territory. Jamaica operated on a separate currency, but its 
profits would accrue to the federal government on the same terms. The commission 
estimated that currency profits would amount to L125,000 a year from the eastern 
Caribbean islands, plus L 70,000 from Jamaica, for a total of L 195,000 per year.9 
The commission recommended that the federal government collect consumption 
taxes, customs duties on imports and excise duties at the same rate on local products 
including gasoline, cigarettes, beer, rum, and other liquors. 10 The estimated income from 
a five cent per gallon tax on gasoline, a sixty-two cent per pound tax on cigarettes, a 
twenty-five cent per liquid gallon on beer, a sixty-five per proof gallon on rum, and a 
seventy-five cent per proof gallon on other liquor would be L 1.45 million. The plan 
SIn 1951 the eastern Caribbean British colonies adopted a common currency based 
on recommendations made at the Montego Bay Conference of 1947. See Conference on 
Closer Association, Part 1, 22-27; "Eastern Group of British Caribbean Reach First Stage 
of Unified Currency," Caribbean Commission Monthly Information Bulletin 5 (October 
195 I), 74. 
9 Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 31-32. British Guiana participated in the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Board, so its profits would have to be deducted from the 
amount provided to the federal government unless that colony decided to join the 
federation. See Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 32. 
IOThe commission recommended as well that the federal government have the 
power to extend duties to other forms of petroleum, liquor, and tobacco in order to 
counter attempts at evasion by substitution. See Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 33. 
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allowed the federal government to raise the tax rates a small amount in the first five years 
to bring in an estimated total of L 1. 9 million if necessary. II The total estimated revenue 
from federal duties, currency profits, and other sources, which the commission noted 
were at present negligible, would amount to L 1.65 million. With a proposed cost of 
federation ofLl.387 million, the federal government could meet its expenses, with a 
small amount available to satisfy unexpected costs. 12 
The commission showed that it was aware of the concerns of the islands when it 
addressed the issue of financial agreements between the islands and the unit governments. 
It suggested that loose financial arrangements would mean that the federal government 
would be independent upon the islands, which would retain financial control of the 
federation. In a sense federal officials would not be responsible to the individuals who 
elected them, but to the unit governments. In other words, the federal structure would be 
weak. The commission concluded that "it is not on such a basis that a FederaL 
Government worthy to speak for the peoples of the British Caribbean can be created.,,13 It 
claimed that the federal government should be able to expect a reasonable degree of both 
freedom and security, and that it should speak for the people of the region and not the 
local governments. In that vein, it recommended that the islands make financial matters 
subject to constitutional control, and not to ad hoc agreements. 14 
IIReport of the Fiscal Commissioner, 33-36. 
12According to the commission the negligible revenue would add up to only about 
LIO,OOO. Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 37-38. 
I3Report o/the Fiscal Commissioner, 41. 
14Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 39-42. 
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Once again the islands met to consider the question of financing the federation 
and the Caine Report. At the 1956 meeting in London, initial discussion centered on the 
idea of the customs union, and what it would mean to internal free trade. Trinidad and 
Jamaica favored the early implementation of free trade, which would allow them to avoid 
duties on their exports imposed by the smaller islands. At the same time the smaller 
islands objected because it would mean a loss of market share in their own islands. 15 
A customs union also meant the imposition of uniform tariffs that wouLd increase 
customs receipts in Trinidad and decrease them in most of the other islands. The small 
islands objected to what they perceived as a loss of income to their islands and their 
government. In addition, Jamaica objected to the idea of the federal government setting a 
uniform tariff, which that island wanted to be free to adjust itself.16 Jamaica supported 
the consumption tax as recommended by the Caine report, under which it would pay less, 
but the other islands rejected it. 17 
Finally, Manley suggested the idea of levying a charge on the revenue of each 
unit, within the minimum and maximum limits set out in the Caine report and 
apportioned between the units in accordance with one of the percentage scales in the 
report, for the first five years of the federation. His proposal rejected every previous 
ISJohn Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968), 55. 
16Mordecai, The West Indies, 55-56. 
17According to the Caine report's recommendations, Jamaica would pay 47.4 
percent of customs duties, but only 42.4 percent of consumption taxes. See Report of the 
Fiscal Commissioner, 38; Mordecai, The West Indies, 56-57. 
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report from Montego Bay in 1947, the Standing Closer Association Conference 
recommendations of 1948, the London Conference of 1953, and the Caine report of 1955, 
which all agreed that the federal government had to have its own direct source of finance 
and that it must not be dependent on the islands for support. Levying an individual 
charge on the local governments meant that the federal government would have to rely on 
them to pay the fee, thus making the federal government subject to the discretion of the 
units. On 23 February 1956, the islands accepted unanimously the mandatory levy 
without any discussion or debate. 18 
TABLE 6-1 
SHARE OF FEDERAL REVENUES AMONG TERRITORIES 
ON DIFFERENT BASES l9 
On basis of import On basis of Standing On basis of Caine 
duties as levied in 1954 Closer Association Commission figures 
Figures 
$000 Percent $000 Percent SOOO Percent 
Jamaica 3,744 47.4 3,090 39.1 3,348 42.4 
Trinidad 2,578 32.6 3,318 42.0 3,126 39.6 
Barbados 800 10.1 843 10.7 675 8.5 
Leeward & Windward 
IsLands (total) 782 9.9 653 8.2 755 9.5 
Grenada 152 1.9 129 1.6 130 1.6 
St. Vincent 99 1.3 91 1.2 101 1.3 
St. Lucia 115 1.5 91 1.2 140 1.8 
Dominica 107 1.4 87 1.1 120 1.5 
Antigua 137 1.7 98 1.2 107 1.4 
St. Kitts 151 1.9 139 1.7 133 1.7 
Montserrat 21 0.3 18 0.2 24 0.3 
The Islands dIscarded every report that stressed the need for a strong federal 
government, free from financial dependence on the islands, and i.nstead instituted a levy 
that they perceived would do them less hann back home, because it freed them from the 
18Wal1ace, The British Caribbean, 115, 122; Mordecai, The West Indies, 57-58. 
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difficulty of having to tell their island constituents that taxes on cigarettes, rum, and beer 
would go up. Instead, though, they committed themselves to pay revenues that they did 
not even discuss. In fact, by committing themselves to the Caine report proportions the 
representatives from Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Dominica committed their islands to paying 
a larger proportion than would have been required of them under a customs union. The 
contributions from Grenada, Antigua, and St. Kitts dropped by less than one-half of one 
percent, while St. Vincent and Montserrat paid the same under both plans. Jamaica, 
which initiated the proposal, saved the most, five percent.20 (See Table 6-1.) 
The British decried the fact that the Caribbean islanders had subordinated the 
federal government to the individual territories, but the delegates were more concerned 
with the effects of the proposed consumption tax on their political futures at home. In 
addition, the small islands were grateful to have avoided the problem of free trade for the , 
. 
time being. For the longer term, the delegates agreed to amend, as quickly as possible, 
the preamble to the federal constitution. They considered it necessary for the economic 
strength of the federation to introduce a customs union that included internal free trade, 
as quickly as possible. 21 For the moment the islands had solved the problem of financing 
the federation, but it was an issue they would have to face again in the days ahead. 
19Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 38. 
2°Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 38. 
21Mordecai, The West Indies, 59-60. 
CHAPTER VII 
PRE-FEDERAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIA nONS 
While the British Caribbean territories were debating the pros and cons of 
federating, they were participating in a variety of cooperative associations as well. Some 
originated in the course of debate about the proposed federation. Others came about 
when the Caribbean islanders realized the benefits derived from cooperative ventures. 
Closer communications among the islands after World War II provided them with the 
option of regional cooperation they had lacked prior to 1940. 
Great Britain instituted the first programs of regional cooperation in the area when 
parliament passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940. The West Indies 
Royal Commission findings of 1938 emphasized the need for government-sponsored 
social services. The commission also recognized that only Britain could develop a plan 
for economic and social development in the island and provide the resources to 
implement that plan. Individual Caribbean governments lacked the resources or 
experience to bring about widespread changes. I 
With the first allocation of funds the British established the Development and 
Welfare Organization in the West Indies in Barbados. In the first years of the 
IGreat Britain, Colonial Office, West India Royal Commission Report (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945),427-428. 
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organization operated largely to supply emergency funds for such projects as the building 
of airfields. By 1945, however, the organization was acting in an advisory role to the 
colonial govenunents, which drew up development plans. Then the British govenunent 
approved the money, which the colonies used to finance their plans.2 
The funds provided under the act not only allowed the islands to develop 
individual plans, but also to cooperate in regional operations. In 1944 the organization 
sponsored the West Indian Conference, which provided a forum at which to discuss and 
debate social and economic topics of general West Indian interest. The organization had 
sponsored a series of regional meetings as well, most of which the local governments 
requested, on broadcasting, import control, labor affairs, quarantine, air transport, 
agriculture, prison administration, and the unification of the currency.) This was only the 
first step toward cooperation. 
In 1951, following the recommendation of the Montego Bay Conference, the 
governments of the British West Indian territories established the Regional Economic 
Committee, which was closely associated with the Development and Welfare 
2Great Britain, Colonial Office, Development and We(fare in the West Indies, 
1947-49 (London; His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950),6-8. W.A. Lewis of St. Lucia, 
a British-educated economist, was one of the few voices critical of British efforts at 
economic development in the West Indies. He claimed that the plans for development the 
British approved did nothing to solve the basic economic problems ofthe region, because 
colonial administrators could not recognize the problems, which he claimed were lack of 
knowledge of production techniques, lack of capital, and too much small scale 
agriculture. He admitted, however, that by 1949 conditions had begun to improve. Sec 
W. Arthur Lewis, "Colonial Development in British Territories, I," Caribbean 
Commission Monthly Information Bulletin 2 (June 1949), 309; W. Arthur Lewis, 
"Colonial Development in British Territories, II," Caribbean Commission Monthly 
Information Bulletin 2 (July 1949),357. 
3Development and Welfare, 1947-49, 10. 
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Organization. It consisted of one member appointed from each of the West Indian 
governments, plus the economic adviser to Development and Welfare! It provided a 
center for promoting, coordinating, and servicing regional action on trade, export 
industries, communications, and public finance. This committee was active in 
developing ideas for the marketing of some of the area's principal exports, developing 
intra-Caribbean trade, exploring possibilities for new markets, and providing commodity 
surveys and statistical infonnation. It sponsored a Civil Aviation Council, a British 
Caribbean Citrus Association, as well as other regional bodies.s 
The Regional Economic Committee was important because it provided the first 
opportunity for the island leaders to work closely together. It met in different territories 
by their invitation. Because the islanders cooperated so successfully here, the committee 
became the clearing house for pre-federal cooperative action and ideas.6 
In addition to its regional projects, the regional economic committee set up West 
Indies Trade Commissions and Students and Migrants Services in London and Montreal, 
and a Students Service in Washington, D.C. In 1951 a delegation of British West Indian 
4British Guiana and British Honduras participated in this commission as well. See 
Great Britain, Colonial Office, The West Indies: A Nation in the Making (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), l7. 
5The West Indies, 17-18; John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal 
Negotiations (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , 1968), 43-44. 
6The West Indies, 17-18; Mordecai, The West Indies, 43-44. 
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leaders went to Washington to discuss with the State Department the question of migrant 
workers employed in agricultural positions in the United States. 7 
A good example of regional cooperation involved tourism. As a result of a 
recommendation by the Third Session of the West Indian Conference held in Guadeloupe 
in 1948, the islands formed the Caribbean Interim Tourism Committee in 1949 to begin 
explorations designed to lead to the formation of a permanent body. Representatives 
from Trinidad, the Leeward Islands, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, along with some 
of the non-British territories, made a preliminary survey of their tourist possibilities. 
They developed plans to attract capital to invest in the creation of facilities for tourism 
and to provide technical advice on hotel and resort development, transportation and the 
promotion of tourism, particularly in the United States.8 
One of the most important examples of regional cooperation in education 
and research was the University College of the West Indies, founded in Jamaica in 1949. 
In 1945 the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies issued a report 
recommending a university for the West Indies. It argued that in light ofthe insularity of 
the islands the commission believed that a university would help further cooperative 
development in the West Indies. At the same time it would serve to keep educated West 
Indians at home, rather than losing them to Great Britain or the United States, the 
countries that were currently educating them. The commission argued that by keeping 
7The West Indies, 17-18; "1950, A Year of Progress for the British Caribbean," 
Caribbean Commission Monthly Information Bulletin 5 (November 1951), 118; 
Mordecai, The West Indies, 43-44. 
8Great Britain, Colonial Office, Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 
1950 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951),9. 
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the educated at home, the university could provide responsible and well-informed 
leadership for the future. 9 
The territorial governments supported the college which opened in 1949 with 
thirty-three students, who could take classes in physics, chemistry, botany. and zooLogy. 
Natural sciences classes began later in 1949, and in 1950 the curriculum expanded to 
include modem history, English, Latin, French, and Spanish. By 1958 it had five 
hundred students from throughout the British Caribbean, who could take classes in the 
arts, sciences, and medicine. The college included an Institute of Education, an Institute 
of Social and Economic Research, and a Department of Extra-Mural Studies. 1O 
The Extra-Mural department was particularly important to the far-flung islands. It 
provided resident tutors in Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad, the 
Windward Islands, British Guiana, and British Honduras. They offered a variety of both 
academic and cultural enrichment courses. For example, by the time of Federation in 
Barbados, students could take classes in French, English, Latin, history, and mathematics, 
as well as special course offerings in education, economics, music, and science. J I 
9Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the West Indies Committee a/the 
Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1945), 15-16. 
IOThe West indies, 18,39; Development and Welfare, 48. In 1958 there were also 
over three thousand British Caribbean students studying in the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and the United States. Many ofthese received scholarships from their own governments, 
or from development and welfare funds. See The West indies, 39. 
I JDevelopment and Welfare, 1947-48,48; Great Britain, Colonial Office, 
Barbados, 1960-1961 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), 59. 
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Another area of cooperation was agriculture. Inter-territorial producers' 
associations, representing the interests of producers in the whole British West Indies, 
included the British West Indies' Sugar Producers' Association, the Federation of 
Primary Producers of the British Caribbean and British Guiana, the West Indian Sea 
Island Cotton Association, the British Caribbean Citrus Association, and the West Indian 
Limes Association.12 
Participation in the Caribbean Commission, which promoted consultation and 
collaboration in addressing regional problems affecting the whole Caribbean area, also 
fostered a sense of cooperation among the British West Indian islanders. It began as a 
joint Anglo-American Commission in 1942, when the United States leased British bases 
in the Caribbean. The two countries realized that it was desirable to promote cooperation 
and an exchange of information about a wide range of ideas. They extended it to include 
France and the Netherlands in 1946, and renamed it the Caribbean Commission. The 
commission itself was made up of four members appointed by the metropolitan 
governments, but it held a biennial West Indian conference at which two representatives 
from each of the territories met to examine and discuss subjects specific to the area. For 
example, in 1944, the commission met in Barbados, with all the British West Indies 
islands represented, as well as the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin 
Islands. The delegates discussed such varied topic as nutritional problems, public works 
to improve agriculture, education, housing and public health, health protection and 
quarantine, and industrial development. In 1944 the commission established the 
12The West Indies, 19. 
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Caribbean Research Council, with sectional committees to deal with particular aspects of 
research. The council's standing committees included agriculture, fisheries, wildlife and 
forestry, economics and statistics, engineering, industrial development, medicine, public 
health and nutrition, and sociology and education. 13 
As early as 1949, C. W. W. Greenidge, a retired Barbadian lawyer, could proclaim 
that there was a new West Indian attitude apparent in the region. He contended that the 
islanders now considered themselves West Indians, regardless of the island they occupied 
or their cultural heritage. He praised the Development and Welfare Organization and the 
Caribbean Commission for fostering the new identity. 14 Greenidge was correct, but this 
cooperative spirit and West Indies outlook did not translate to the federation. Although 
the islanders had learned the advantages of collaboration, they were still reluctant to give 
up their local identities to a federal government. 
13Great Britain, Colonial Office, British Dependencies in the Caribbean and North 
Atlantic, 1939-1952 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952),73-74; The West 
Indies, 19; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 
1943-44 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945),92. 
14C.W.W. Greenidge, "The Present Outlook in the British West Indies," 
Caribbean Commission Monthly Information Bulletin, 2 (July 1949), 362. 
-CHAPTER VIII 
THE BIRTH OF THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION AND ITS DEMISE 
On Friday, January 3, 1958, the West Indies Federation came into existence. 
There was much work ahead before the new country attained freedom from Great Britain, 
but the official inauguration of the Caribbean experiment in federation was already the 
result of a great deal of debate and cooperation. The member islands were optimistic that 
they were on the road to complete self-government. Once again a series of conferences 
would provide the battleground for the divisive issues that remained. 
The arrival of Governor-General Lord Hailes marked the formal begirming of the 
Federation. Hailes was not part of the Colonial Office. He had served as parliamentary 
private secretary to Oliver Stanley from 1931-1939, and as conservative chief whip and 
government chief whip from 1951-1955. From 1955-1957 Hailes was minister of works. 
His appointment highlighted one of the problems the islands had yet to solve as well : 
freeing themselves from British control. Lord Hailes was virtually unknown in the West 
Indies. The British Government had appointed him without submitting a list of potential 
candidates to the island leaders, although it did discuss the qualities necessary to be 
governor general. West Indians argued that the British government had sacrificed the 
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well-being of the Federation in order to give a political plum to a party official. The 
islanders wanted an experienced colonial civil servant in the position. J 
Clearly, the British intended that Hailes be more than a figurehead, particularly 
during the early years of Federation. The Constitution afforded him sweeping powers. 
Among other things, he appointed all the senators, justices of the Federal Supreme Court, 
and members of the Public Service Commission. He could refuse to agree to any bill 
passed by the House or Senate and reserve it for review by the British government. 
However, Hailes asserted few of his powers and by 1960 he had relinquished some of 
them. Hailes arrived with full British pomp and ceremony, which was enough to insult 
the nationalist leaders of the islands. Yet from the beginning the islanders accepted 
Hailes as a sincere and enthusiastic official, and vowed to work with him for West Indian 
independence.2 
The first Federal elections took place on March 25. This presented the islanders 
with another problem. Under the constitution candidates could not be members of their 
local governments; as a result, several men whom the islanders expected to lead them 
through the early years of federation, most notably Norman Manley of Jamaica, and Eric 
Williams of Trinidad, decided not to run for federal office, because they believed they 
lElisabeth Wallace, The British Caribbean: From the Decline afColonialism to 
the End of Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 138; John 
Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1968), 72. 
2Mordecai, The West Indies, 75-77; Douglas G. Anglin, "The Political 
Development of the West Indies," in David Lowenthal, ed., The West Indies Federation: 
Perspectives on a New Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 49-50, 52-
53. 
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could serve the Federation best by supporting it at home.3 There absence weakened the 
Federal government before it even began, because they were the most experiences West 
Indian politicians available and both were highly regarded throughout the islands. 
The results of the election produced another surprise. West Indians expected the 
Federal Labour Party, which was made up of all the parties then holding local power on 
all the islands except St. Vincent, to gain control of the federal government.4 However, 
the Federal Labour Party won only twenty-two of the forty-five seats available. The 
Democratic Labour Party, which had been ignored for the most part, gained twenty seats, 
including a majority in both Jamaica and Trinidad. Three independent candidates, two 
from Grenada and one from Barbados, garnered the remaining seats, and commanded the 
balance of power in the House.s So, the political parties that had guided the pre-federal 
process would not control the new Federal government. 
At the same time there were surprises at the local level. The ruling parties of 
Williams in Trinidad and Manley in Jamaica suffered defeat as well. This was to prove 
extremely important in the case of Jamaica, because Manley's chief political rival, 
Alexander Bustamante, opposed Jamaica's participation in the Federation. In addition, 
3Wallace, The British Caribbean, 143-146; Mordecai, The West Indies, 78-85. 
4The West Indies Federal Labour Party, inaugurated in 1957, included Manley's 
People's National Party in Jamaica, Adams' Barbados Labour Party, as well as the small 
island parties. Williams' People's National Movement of Trinidad was an ally, but not a 
full member. See Anglin, "The Political Development of The West Indies," 47. 
SMordecai, The West Indies, 86; Anglin, "The Political Development of The West 
Indies," 47-48; Great Britain, British Information Services, Barbados (London: Central 
Office of Information, 1966), 7. 
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the islanders showed a marked lack of interest in the new government. For example, in 
Barbados only twenty-six percent of registered voters went to the polls.6 
The first business of the House of Representatives was the choice of a prime 
minister. Because Manley, the logical choice, had chosen not to run for Federal office, 
the House selected the number two man in the Federal Labour Party, Grantley Adams of 
Barbados. 7 He immediately set out to consolidate the power of the federal government. 
The first issue Adams confronted concerned the site of the federal capital. 
Although Trinidad would host the Federal government, the problem was where on 
Trinidad to place the federal capital. The Standing Federation Committee had decided 
that the optimal site was the Chaguaramas military base, which happened to be the 
property of the United States as a result of the Lend-Lease deal with Britain in 1941. 
When the British refused to intercede on the part of the Federation, and the United States 
declined to negotiate with the Federation, Williams, contrary to his belief in a strong 
central government, argued that it was a decision for Trinidad to make, not the federal 
government. Adams, however, managed to conclude an agreement with the United States 
that would defer the decision for ten years, at which time the Americans promised to 
review the need for the base in light of international issues existing then. 8 
6Mordecai, The West Indies, 86-87. 
7Mordecai, The West Indies, 89; Wallace, The British Caribbean, 145. 
8Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Chaguaramas Joint Commission 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), 1-2; S. Walter Washington, "Crisis in 
the British West Indies," Foreign Affairs 38 (July 1960),654; Eric Williams, Inward 
Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1971),204-209; Mordecai, The West Indies, 107-123; Wallace, The British Caribbean, 
117-118. 
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This was a victory for Adams and the Federal government, but it caused a rift 
between Adams and Williams, who believed that the issue of the American base was the 
concern of Trinidad, not the Federal government. Williams renewed his protests a year 
later, in July 1959, when he attacked the United States for condoning smuggling at the 
base and exposing Trinidadians to the risk of radiation. He pressed for a four-power 
meeting of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal government, and Trinidad 
to discuss the problems. Adams responded by agreeing to a three-power meeting, to 
which the Federal government would invite Trinidadian participation. The debate 
escalated for a year, culminating in a local protest in Trinidad which signified the 
country's nationalism and its increasing separation from the Federal government.9 
Finally, the British decided to take an active part in the problem. Secretary of 
State lain MacLeod proposed a three-stage series of meetings. Stage I was a conference 
of representatives of the Federal and local governments with the United States and Great 
Britain which took place on Tobago in November and December 1960. The United States 
agreed to release to Trinidad 21,000 acres which included unused portions of 
Chaguaramas as well as other sites on the islands; they would retain only those essential 
to their responsibilities for defense. The United States agreed to supply surplus water for 
local use and to provide economic assistance to Trinidad to improve port facilities at Port 
of Spain, rehabilitate the largely obsolete Trinidad Government Railway system, improve 
the road between Chaguaramas and Port of Spain, and develop the Trinidad College of 
9Washington, "Crisis," 653-654; Mordecai, The West Indies, 189-195; Wallace, 
The British Caribbean, 167-168; Williams, Inward Hunger, 213-225. 
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Arts and Sciences as a college of the University of the West Indies. The United States 
agreed, as well, to a series of reviews which would guarantee that they evacuated the base 
within seventeen years. All the participants agreed that an autonomous West Indies 
would have the right to fonn its own alliances and make its own agreements about 
military bases on its territory. 10 
Stage II meetings took place in December in St. Lucia, Antigua, and Jamaica in 
which the United States formally released deactivated bases on those islands, as well as 
the unused portions of Chaguaramas. Stage III was the signing ceremony which took 
place in Port of Spain in February, 1961 . II Although the meetings settled the matter of 
ownership and control of the bases, they failed to address the issue of the Federal capital. 
Adams considered the results a failure for the Federal government and a success for 
Williams and Trinidad. 
Another important issue that the islands had failed to solve involved the freedom 
of movement of persons within the Federation. Barbados, the Leewarc Islands, and the 
Windward Islands considered unrestricted movement between the islands a keystone of 
Federation and one of its prime benefits. These islands had severe economic probJems, 
because their agricultural industries could not provide enough jobs to support their large 
popUlations. Trinidad believed, on the other hand, that it would be saddled with a rush 
of immigrants that would aggravate its already serious social and economic problems. 
Trinidad's oil industry provided jobs for Trinidadians plus some emigrants. but it could 
10Wallace, The British Caribbean, 179;Mordecai, The West Indies , 236-237,299-
303; Williams, Inward Hunger, 239. 
"Wallace, The British Caribbean, 179-180; Mordecai, The West Indies, 304. 
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not support the large number of emigrants the island anticipated when immigration 
barriers came down. At the same time Trinidad was one of the wealthier British islands, 
but still it had the same social and economic problems of overpopulation that plagued the 
other islands. 12 Williams argued that because the British were responsible for the distress 
in the islands, they should take the excess population from them. Barbados countered 
that the British could hardly be expected to do what the Federation would not. And, 
indeed, the British were cutting immigration levels at that time. 13 
The Federal Constitution provided that five years after Federation, in 1963, all 
united restrictions on migration would expire. Trinidad proposed that the Federal 
government provide funds to alleviate the social and economic distress that it would 
encounter from an influx of migrants. In addition, it proposed that free movement of 
people be tied to free movement of goods. 14 
Finally, in December, leaders and ministers of the national and unit governments 
met to discuss the recent effects of migration. They claimed that migration to Trinidad 
had increased since 1958; they believed it would continue to do so. The nature of the 
migration was principally agricultural workers seeking urban jobs, and squatting in urban 
areas upon arrival, thus adding to the social and economic problems of the island, just as 
Trinidad had predicted. They concluded that if Britain restricted migration after 
\2"The British West Indies and Migration: Population Pressures on Resources," 
The World Today 14 (November 1958),474,476. 
13Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 449. 
14Anglin, "The Political Development of the West Indies," 56-57; Mordecai, The 
West Indies, 211-212. 
independence, the problem in Trinidad would increase. They recommended that the 
Federal government should control freedom of movement, but that until 1967 island 
legislatures should have the power to restrict entry. This would give the islands time to 
establish migration agreements among themselves. IS 
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In May of 1961 another intergovernmental conference reviewed the 
recommendations. The representatives of the islands worked out a final agreement that 
would delay Federal control for nine years, unless it received the support of the unit 
governments. Barbados, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and Dominica voted against the restrictions. 
One month later, however, Trinidad changed its position. Williams argued that it had 
stood by while the islands eroded Federal power on issue after issue, but he drew the line 
at migration, which could only have a negative effect on Trinidad. He threatened that 
Trinidad and Tobago would leave the Federation if it lost its effort to restrict migration. 
He decided to put the issue to a vote of the people of Trinidad. 16 
Meanwhile, another problem had surfaced. In 1958 Jamaica proposed a plan that 
would protect oil refining on that island in direct opposition to the idea of internal free 
trade within the Federation. Within four years the fallout from this proposal would end 
the Federation. 
Jamaica wanted to institute a consumption tax on oiL refining that it could refund 
to Jamaican refiners. Although it was proposed in the fonn of a consumption tax rather 
15Mordecai, The West Indies, 310-314; Wallace, The British Caribbean, 176. 
16Mordecai, The West Indies, 344-346, 369-371. 
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than an import duty, it was c1ear to everyone that its purpose was to protect a refinery it 
wanted to build in Jamaica by exc1uding Trinidad oil. 17 
Both Federal and Trinidadian authorities opposed the tax. Adams objected on the 
grounds that it would hinder the establishment of a successful customs union. He went 
on to propose that the Federal government levy an income tax to support itself, and hinted 
that it might be made retroactive to the beginning of the Federation if the unit 
governments did not allow its implementation earlier than the five years agreed upon 
before the beginning of the Federation. Adams retreated from his remarks a bit when 
faced with widespread criticism throughout the islands, but he continued to lobby for an 
income tax as soon as possible to provide support for the Federal government lS 
Williams attacked the Jamaican proposal from a local standpoint. He called it an 
effort at monopoly control of oil in Jamaica and promised to fight the proposal. Both 
Jamaica and Trinidad hinted that the Federation itself might be undermined by the issue. 
Manley want so far as to promise that if the Federal government were t::> threaten local 
development in Jamaica, Jamaica would have to reconsider its position on Federation. 19 
In Jamaica, Manley's political rival, Alexander Bustamante, quickly stepped into 
the fray. He agreed that Jamaica could not support a Federation that even hinted that it 
might introduce retroactive taxation. He charged that Manley, the chief proponent of 
17Wallace, The British Caribbean, 152; Mordecai, The West Indies, 114-137. 
18Washington, "Crisis," 649-650; Anglin, "The Political Development of The 
West Indies," 59; Mordecai, The West Indies, 124-137. 
19 Anglin, 'The Political Development of the West Indies," 53-54,59; Washington, 
"Crisis," 649; Mordecai, The Westlndies, 124-138. 
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Federation in Jamaica, had misled the islanders from the start. 20 Bustamante proposed 
three changes to the Federal Constitution. He wanted an amendment specifically denying 
the Federal government the right to tax the islands without their prior approval. He 
insisted that representation in the Federal House of Representatives be based on 
population. Finally, he demanded that any customs union be designed so as not to hurt 
Jamaica's workers or its economy. He concluded by reiterating that Jamaica would 
withdraw from the Federation if these demands were not met. 21 From this point on, 
secession would become an open topic of discussion within the Federation. 
Despite their earlier disagreements, Williams came to Adams' defense on this 
Issue. Williams declared that Trinidad was prepared to sacrifice local powers in order to 
promote a strong Federation with taxing powers. The other islands of the Eastern 
Caribbean criticized the prime minister for his unpopular proposals on retroactive 
taxation. St. Lucia supported Jamaica in calling for the amendment of the Constitution in 
order to deny the Federal government its right to levy income taxes. 22 
Adams finally responded by agreeing to convene the Regional Council of 
Ministers. The islands established his group in 1957 as a non-statutory body composed 
of the territorial chief ministers under the chairmanship of the prime minister. Its purpose 
was to confer on issues of common concern that posed different problems for the islands, 
20 Although Bustamante had been critical of the idea of federation at Montego Bay, 
he had put aside his opposition in the years that followed. In fact , he had worked with 
Manley to bring Jamaica into the Federation. See Elisabeth Wallace, "Improbable 
Federation," 445. 
21Mordecai, The West Indies, 138-139; Wallace, "]mprobable Federation," 445. 
22Mordecai, The West Indies, 140-141. 
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with the intent of minimizing tensions before they developed into a problem. Adams had 
been reluctant to convene the council because it would allow the chief ministers, 
particularly Williams and Manley, to playa role in shaping federal policy. Adams 
wanted a strong Federal government on which the islands could not put undue pressure.23 
The council met on January 12-13, 1959. The ministers agreed easily on a 
number of measures including extension of a rice agreement, enactment of Federal 
legislation to regulate the operations of insurance companies, institution of a Federal 
consulting service to assist unit income tax departments, and endorsement of a Federal 
appeal to unit governments to improve port and harbor facilities. The most divisive issue 
on the agenda was the last, economic development. Adams invited the council to issue a 
statement which the Federal government had drafted. It pledged that mutual consultation 
would be used in the future to achieve uniformity in tax legislation and concluded with 
the Federal government's promise to honor territorial concessions. Manley countered 
that a joint statement would be a mistake because the islands were still debating the future 
role of the Federal government. Williams agreed, as did the representatives from 
Barbados, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Adams thanked 
Manley for his contribution to the debate, then went on to say that he believed Jamaica's 
attitude would have been different if it had not been facing an election. Manley and the 
Jamaican delegation immediately left the conference.24 Later that year Jamaica concluded 
23Washington, "Crisis," 651; Mordecai, The West Indies, 147-148. 
24Mordecai, The West Indies, 146-149. 
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a plan for an oil refinery, but it would not be put into place until after the demise of the 
Federation.25 
From this point on the oil refinery issue faded into the background while the 
debate on Federation focused on the strength of the Federal government and the issue of 
independence. Manley pressed for a weak central government and dominion status as 
soon as possible. He argued that the islands should decide the most important issues of 
the Federation, particularly those involving taxes and economic development.26 Williams 
and his followers continued to demand a strong central government and early full 
independence from Britain.27 The smaller islands ofthe Eastern Caribbean sided with 
Williams, because they believed that Manley was trying to exploit them by gaining 
control of the Federal government. One island went so far as to declare that they would 
only be trading one colonial master for another ifthey let lamaica shape the Federal 
government on its own ternlS without considering the other islands.28 
When the islands met in September 1959 to discuss the future of the Federation. 
seventy-three ministers and advisers made the meeting virtually unmanageable. After 
opening speeches that expressed faith in the Federation, the delegates immediately 
stalemated over the agenda. Jamaica refused to participate unless the delegates first 
25Mordecai, The West Indies, 149-150. 
26Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 450. 
27 Williams had consistently called for a strong federation, even when he was 
saying that Trinidad should be the one to conduct negotiations with the United States 
over the Chaguaramas base. See Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 445. 
28Mordecai, The West Indies, 155-160; Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 445, 
450. 
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settled the issue ofrepresentation in the Federal House. Manley dismissed the fear that 
Jamaica would dominate a body based on representation by population, because, he 
claimed, party politics would always leave Jamaica's detegation divided. After much 
haggling, Manley finally agreed to submit the issue of representation to a committee. 
The islands agreed to make further meetings less cumbersome by limiting representation. 
In the future each unit and the Federal government would have one vote, which meant 
that six of the small islands voting together would outvote the larger islands on any 
subject.29 
Most West Indians believed that the Federation could not survive without 
Jamaica, so they made every effort to meet Jamaica's demands. By 1960 the islands had 
agreed to a formula for representation based on population. The islands decided to 
increase the number of seats in the House of Representatives to sixty-four. Each island 
unit would have one seat plus an additional seat for each population unit of 55 ,000. 
Under this formula Jamaica's representatives would increase from seventeen to thirty-
one, or 48.4 percent of the House. Trinidad gained five seats, from ten to fifteen, or 23.4 
percent. The representation of Barbados, the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands 
remained the same. The islands used the census of 1960 for their figures, but allowed for 
regular reviews, with a maximum House size of seventy seats.]O 
29Wallace, The British Caribbean, 160; Mordecai, The Westlndies, 173-181; 
Williams, Inward Hunger, 183-184. 
30Mordecai, The West Indies, 197-198; Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 446. 
The Federal government, Dominica, and Grenada tried to raise the issue of representation 
once more at an intergovernmental meeting in 1961. They objected to the formula based 
on population and suggested a percentage ceiling of forty percent for anyone island unit. 
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It was also at this point that the British decided to take a more active role in the 
federal negotiations. At a London Conference in January 1960, lain Macleod, the 
colonial secretary, presented the minimum requirements for an independent Federation, 
including a defense force, the power to negotiate and conclude treaties, and a central 
government that controlled the currency and had sufficient financial resources. The 
British required a customs union as well, and freedom of movement, but Macleod 
diplomatically conceded that the British might accept progress toward finalizing these 
plans. He concluded by saying that the British considered the West Indies particularly 
suited for independence because of its long experience of parliamentary government, its 
respect for rule oflaw, and its emphasis on the value of the individual. Finally, he 
promised that on May 31, 1962, the Federation would become an independent member of 
the Commonwealth, and that each unit would have internal self-government before that 
date. 3 ! 
In another effort to placate Jamaica, the islands approved measures that would 
weaken the Federation. The Federal government would be able to impose an income tax, 
but only through an amendment to the Federal Constitution supported by a majority in the 
two federal houses and in the lower houses of each island unit. This meant that each 
Their idea received no support from the other islands, which voted it down eight to three. 
See Mordecai, The West Indies, 344. 
3lWallace, The British Caribbean, 164; Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 449-
450,452. 
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island had veto power over income taxes, so the t 2,000 inhabitants of Montserrat had the 
same power as the 825,000 of Trinidad or the half-million Jamaicans. ·n 
Despite the islands' efforts to meet Jamaica's demands, Manley could not stop his 
political problems at home. Bustamante continued to attack Jamaica's participation in the 
Federation. Manley managed to delay the referendum vote through all of 1960, until 
September 1961. The question put to the voters of Jamaica was simple: "Should Jamaica 
remain in the Federation ofthe West Indies?,,33 
Many Jamaicans favored Federation. The mercantile and trading communities 
could see new outlets in regional expansion. Middle-class intellectuals liked the idea of 
developing an active and identifiable West Indian culture and society. The civil service 
sector viewed Federation as an opportunity for advancement. On the other hand, rural 
Jamaicans knew or cared little about the West Indies Federation.34 Although the poor on 
the other island had benefited from development projects initiated by the Federal 
government, Jamaica had not taken advantage of aid to help its rural inhabitants. 
Therefore, these people had fewer opportunities to come into direct contact with the 
advantages of the Federation.35 
32Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 451. 
33Wallace, The British Caribbean, 171-172; Mordecai, The West Indies, 392-401. 
34Wallace disagreed. She claimed that in her conversations with sugar workers 
and taxi drivers, she found them quite familiar with the Federation and willing to accept 
it. See Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 445. 
35Mordecai, The West Indies, 402-403. 
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Manley appealed to the voters on behalf of the Federation. He claimed that 
supporting the Federal government would cost Jamaica half of what it would take to fund 
independence on its own. He promised bigger markets, more jobs, and more room for 
development within the Federation. He pleaded on the basis of contemporary political 
thought. He told Jamaicans that the world trend favored political union for small 
countries contemplating independence, so if Jamaica joined the Federation it could expect 
help from the great nations.36 
Bustamante argued for isolationism. He promised that if Jamaica joined the 
Federation, the small islands would rule both with incompetence. He stressed the 
distance between Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean. He countered Manley's view of 
wider trade within the Federation by claiming that Trinidad would benefit, not Jamaica. 
He pointed out that regional institutions advantageous to Jamaica had existed before 
Federation and did not require a political union for membership.37 
On September 19, 1961, Jamaicans went to the polls. They voted against 
Federation by a count of 54.1 percent to 45.9 percent, with 60.87 percent of registered 
voters participating.38 As expected, it was the rural population that decided the election. 
Most of them were sufficiendy uninterested in Federation to stay away from the polis. 
36Mordecai, The West Indies, 404; Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 447. 
37Mordecai, The West Indies, 404. 
38A total of256,261 of Jamaicans voted no, while 217,319 voted in favor of 
Federation. See, Great Britain, Colonial Office, Jamaica: The Making of a Nation 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), 8; Great Britain, British lnfonnation 
Services, Barbados (London: Central Office ofInfonnation, 1966),8; Mordecai, The 
West Indies, 410. 
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They did not care enough to vote for or against the coalition. Shortly after midnight 
Manley conceded defeat and apologized to the rest of the West Indies.39 
The question that now remained was whether Trinidad would continue to support 
the Federation. Williams had always been a strong federalist, but he had managed to 
alienate most of the federal leaders over the last few years by his stand on the issue of 
migration.40 Meanwhile, the British agreed to release Jamaica from the Federation no 
later than March 1962. Because there was no provision in the Federal Constitution for 
secession, and because the West Indies Federation had not yet become independent of 
Britain, the British Parliament had to agree to let Jamaica leave. Williams declared that if 
the British consented to Jamaica's secession, he would consider the Federation as it then 
existed dissolved on the date Jamaica left. In January 1962, after considering the 
economic and financial implications of reforming a federation with Barbados and the 
Leeward and Windward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago decided to abandon the federal 
movement.41 Despite numerous attempts to entice Williams to keep Trinidad and Tobago 
in the Federation he stood firm against the idea. The West Indies Federation was dead. 
39Mordecai, The West Indies, 410-414; Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 458. 
4°Mordecai, The West indies, 415-416. 
4lGreat Britain, British Information Services, Trinidad and Tobago: The Making 
of a Nation (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), 13; Barbados, 8; 
Mordecai, The West Indies, 426-427. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The West Indies Federation failed because Jamaica chose to leave. Although that 
was true, it was far from the whole story. The Jamaica vote did not address any ofthe 
real difficulties the islands had encountered in putting together the Federation. It was a 
local vote that had more to do with the struggle for power between Norman Manley and 
Alexander Bustamante. The vote itself continned that; it reflected regional differences 
and customary party lines. I 
Critics have pointed to weak leadership in the West Indies, particularly that of 
Grantley Adams in the Federal government, as the cause for failure. They contend that if 
Manley had run for federal office and become prime minister, he could have kept the 
Federation together. 2 Although Adams did lack the Caribbean-wide appeal of Manley, 
and did tend to alienate local island leaders, his leadership, or lack of it, did not determine 
I Charles H. Archibald, "The Failure of the West Indies Federation," The World 
Today 18 (June 1962),235. 
2Some argued that Adams' position in the Federal Labour Party, second in 
command to Manley, bothered Adams so much that it interfered with his relations with 
Manley. However, there was no evidence that Adams favored Manley or did not. He had 
equally bad relations with many other West Indian leaders during the course of the 
federal negotiations. See Elisabeth Wallace, "Improbable Federation?" Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science 27 (November] 961),447. 
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the outcome of the Federation. At best, Adams could be accused of failing to develop a 
West Indies attitude by selling the idea of Federation to the islands. At the same time 
evidence of conversations with sugar workers and taxi drivers suggested that they did 
know about the Federation and how it might benefit them.3 In any event, Adams was 
usually busy trying to shape the diverse views of the islands' leaders into coherent policy. 
If Manley had chosen to lead the Federation, his presence might have made federation 
more acceptable to Jamaicans, but Federal laws precluded him from holding office in the 
Federal government and in Jamaica, too, and he chose to retain his role in Jamaican 
politics.4 
The geographical and cultural differences of the islands have attracted attention as 
a cause of the federal failure as well. There was, indeed, intense insularity in the West 
Indian islands. At Montego Bay in 1947, many islanders met each other for the first 
time.5 Poor communications and transportation, as welJ as British policy, had worked to 
keep the units separate for centuries. However, the islands shared muc.h in cornman, too. 
They were all agriculture-based economies. They had similar economic and social 
problems. They shared a common language and a common political tradition. They all 
had been British colonies for over a century. In addition, improved communications and 
3Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 445. 
4Archibald, "The Failure ofthe West Indies Federation," 239-240; Elisabeth 
Wallace, "The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall," International Journal 17 
(Summer 1962), 284. 
SWaUace, "Improbable Federation," 453. 
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transportation after World War II had brought them closer together.6 Most importantly 
they had already come together on any number of regional cooperative ventures. The 
islanders were well aware that they had power in numbers. They willingly cooperated 
when it was in their best interests to do so, and when they did not have to relinquish 
autonomy to do so. Their geographic and cultural differences existed, but not to the 
extent of subverting cooperation.7 These differences could have been overcome by the 
Federation. 
The most divisive issues of the pre-federal period involved economic and political 
control. Although the islanders were willing to come together on ventures that benefited 
from regional cooperation, they were unwilling to accept control by a central government. 
In 1961 there was still no common postage or coinage. Each island continued to control 
immigration and customs. There was no reason for an islander to think in tenns of the 
West fndies Federation, because he was still Jamaican, or Kittian, and guided by that 
island's laws.8 
The real problem for the Federation was the idea itself. The British had spent 
years keeping the islands separate. West Indians were accustomed to living apart. If the 
British believed cooperation was so important, why had they failed to introduce it prior to 
1947? Charles Archibald pointed to Arthur Creech Jones' promises of individual 
6Wallace points out that although transportation improved, it was still out of the 
question for most of the Caribbean population. It did, however, allow government 
leaders to interact. See Wallace, "Decline and Fall," 270. 
7Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 457. 
8Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 454. 
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progress towards self-government made at the Montego Bay Conference in 1947 as proof 
that the British knew well the habit of separateness that was so ingrained in West Indian 
life, and wanted to promise the islands that their combined efforts would not deter their 
individual progress.9 The Caribbean islanders wanted to be British. They believed in the 
civil and political liberties of the British tradition. They wanted those for themselves. 10 
Unfortunately for the British, the West Indians wanted them to apply individually to their 
islands. They could not agree to relinquish them to a Federal government. In 1962, 
Elisabeth Wallace, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, wrote: "No one 
familiar with these islands, with their diverse histories, marked individualities, and strong 
local attachments, would seriously expect them to accept, in all important public affairs, 
the central direction of unitary government.,,11 
The British knew the islands well. However, in their rush to rid themselves of the 
least productive of their colonies they ignored the islands' diversity. Instead, the British 
acted in their own best interests by inviting the islands to come together at Montego Bay 
to discuss some type of closer association. To the islands that meant federation. The 
British might have invited the islands to a more general discussion of their future after 
1945. In that way colonial leaders could have provided a forum for island representatives 
to discuss any number of options for independence, including federation or individual 
island sovereignty. The islanders, or the British, could have proposed cooperative 
9 Archibald, "The Failure of the West Indies Federation," 236-237. 
l°Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 448. 
11 Wallace, "Improbable Federation," 454. 
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associations as a prelude to joint political action. Instead, the British invited the islanders 
to explore a plan that British leaders thought would ensure them of another independent 
nation for the Commonwealth. Instead, they raised problems for the West Indian islands 
that lasted for years. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPOSITION OF CONFERENCE ON CLOSER ASSOCIATION 
MONTEGO BAY, JAMAICA 
1947 
Chainnan 
A. Creech Jones, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies 
Deputy Chainnan 
G.F. Seel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office 
Chairman of Committee 
A.M. Crawley, M.P., Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies 
Colony 
Barbados 
Delegates and their Advisers 
Delegates 
H.A. Cuke, Member of 
Legislative Council and 
Executive Committee 
G.H. Adams, Member of 
House of Assembly and 
Executive Committee 
W.A. Crawford, Member of 
House of Assembly and 
Executive Committee 
114 
Advisers 
P.F. Campbell, Acting 
Colonial Secretary 
E.K. Walcott, Attorney 
General 
115 
British Guiana Sir Eustace Woolford, Deputy F. W. Holder. Attorney 
President of Legislative General 
Council 
F.l. Seaford, Member of E.F. McDavid, Colonial 
Legislative and Executive Treasurer 
Councils 
Dr. lB. Singh, Member of 
Legislative and Executive 
Councils 
British Honduras C.M. Staine, Member of A.N. Wolffsohn, Colonial 
Legislative Council Secretary 
K.E. 1. Wade, Member of H.J. Hughes, Attorney 
Legislative Council General 
W.H. Courtenay, Member of 
Legislative and Executive 
Councils 
Jamaica 0.1. ludah, Member of T.H. Mayers, Attorney 
Legislative Council General 
W.A. Bustamante, Member Sir Norman Strathie, 
of House of Representatives Financial Secretary and 
and Executive Council Treasurer 
F.A. Pixley, Member of 
House of Representatives 
and Executive Council 
Leeward Islands A.W. Griffin, Member of S.E. Gomes, Attorney 
General Legislative and General 
Executive Councils and 
Montserrat Legislative and 
Executive Councils 
M.H. Davis, Member of H. Burrowes, Acting 
General Legislative and Administrator of 
Executive Councils and Antigua 
St. Kitts-Nevis Legislative 
and Executive Councils 
-
Trinidad 
Windward Islands 
Grenada 
St. Vincent 
St. Lucia 
Dominica 
V.c. Bird, Member of 
General Legislative Council 
and Antigua Legislative and 
Executive Councils 
T. Roodal, Member of 
Legislati ve and Executi ve 
Councils 
D.e. Hannays, Member of 
Legislative and Executive 
Councils 
A Gomes, Member of 
Legislative and Executive 
Councils 
lB. Renwick, Member of 
Legislative and Executive 
Councils 
S.F. Bonadie, Member of 
Legislative Council 
AM. Lewis, Member of 
Legislative Council 
C.AH. Dupigny, Member of 
Legislative and Executive 
Councils 
H.W. Wilson, Attorney 
General 
R.B. Skinner, Acting 
Financial Secretary 
A.R. Cools Lartigue, 
Attorney General of the 
Windward Islands 
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Professor e.G. Beasley, 
Economic Adviser to the 
Comptroller for 
Development and Welfare 
in the West Indies 
British Section of the Caribbean Commission 
Sir John MacPherson, British Co-Chainnan 
E.E. Sabben-Clare, British Member Resident in Washington 
N.W. Manley 
G. Gordon 
H. P. Hewitt-Myring, Public Relations Adviser to the British Co-Chairman 
Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies 
Sir John MacPherson, Comptroller 
S.A. Hammond, Educational Adviser 
Professor C.G. Beasley, Economic Adviser 
R. Norris, Secretary 
Secretaries 
A.M. MacKintosh, Colonial Office, Secretary 
H.L. Lindo, Jamaica Secretariat, Assistant Secretary 
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Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on Closer Association of the British 
West Indian Colonies. I. Report. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1948, 12-13. 
Barbados: 
British Guiana: 
British Honduras: 
Jamaica 
Antigua: 
St. Kitts-Nevis 
Montserrat 
APPENDIXB 
COMPOSITION OF STANDING CLOSER 
ASSOCIA nON COMMITTEE 
Chainnan 
Major General Sir Hubert Rance 
H.A. Cuke 
Member of the Legislative Council 
G.H. Adams 
Member of the Colonial Parliament 
C.V. Wight 
Vice-President of the Legislative Council 
T. Lee 
Member of the Legislative Council 
W.H. Courtenay 
Member of the Legislative Council 
F.R.Dragten 
D.J. Judah 
Member ofthe Legislative Council 
Clinton Hart 
v.c. Bird 
Member of the Legislative Council 
M.B. Davis 
Member of the Legislative Council 
C.R. Meade 
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Trinidad A. Gomes 
Member of the Legislative Council 
L.C. Hannays 
Member of the Legislative Council 
Dominica A. Winston 
Member of the Legislative Council 
Grenada lB. Renwick 
Member of the Legislative Council 
St. Lucia Garnet H. Gordon 
Member of the Legislative Council 
St. Vincent G. Mcintosh 
Member of the Legislative Council 
Source: Great Britain. Colonial Office. Report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer 
Association Committee, 1948-49. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1950, 5. 
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